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I. INTRODUCTION
Congress, in overriding a presidential veto,' enacted the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 19952 ("Reform Act") which
represented a comprehensive revision of the federal securities laws
governing private securities litigation. The Reform Act was designed to
restructure the private securities litigation system by balancing two
competing interests: deterring and remedying securities fraud and
"assuring that the litigation process is not used for abusive purposes and
does not unfairly target defendants who are guilty of no wrongdoing."3

1. See 141 CONG. REC. H15214 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995) (President Clinton's veto message).
Although the Reform Act received overwhelming support in the House vote to override the
presidential veto (319-100), see id. at H15223, the Senate narrowly met the necessary two-thirds vote
to override the veto (68-30), see id,
at S19180 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1995).
2. Pub. L. No. 104-67,109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
3. Richard M. Phillips & Gilbert C. Miller, The PrivateSecurities Litigation Reform Act of
1995: Rebalancing Litigation Risks and Rewards for Class Action Plaintiffs,
Defendants and
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The Reform Act drew strong support from the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants ("AICPA") and was seen as a victory for
the Certified Public Accountant ("CPA") responsible for auditing the
financial statements4 of a public company. This support reflected years
of harsh treatment experienced by "deep-pocket" defendants in private
securities litigation.' For the independent auditor,6 one such "deeppocket" defendant, this resulted in a legislative compromise, exchanging
proportionate liability for a statutory obligation to act as a "whistleblower" and report illegal acts committed by the company to the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"). The accountant's victory,
therefore, has come with a substantial price, as the auditor will be
required to expend additional time and resources in identifying,
evaluating, and reporting illegal acts. Such a policing role is likely to
have a chilling effect on the relationship between auditors and their
publicly held clients.7
Congressional scrutiny of the auditing profession has existed, in
some form, for the past twenty years. In fact, efforts in the area of

private securities litigation initially focused on the independent auditor
and the revision of accounting and auditing requirements relating to the
detection and disclosure of financial irregularities in publicly held
companies. This scrutiny was precipitated by a series of large-scale
business failures and disclosures of management fraud that occurred
shortly after independent auditors had issued unqualified audit opinions9

Lawyers, 51 Bus. LAw. 1009, 1009 (1996).
4. These generally include the Statement of Financial Position ("Balance Sheet"), the
Statement of Operations ("Income Statement"), the Statement of Retained Earnings, and the
Statement of Cash Flows.
5. During 1992, the six largest accounting firms in the world reported that they spent over
14% of their domestic accounting and audit revenues on legal matters. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at
21 (1995).
6. The terms "accountant' and "auditor" are used interchangeably throughout this Note.
7. See Edward Brodsky, The Auditor'sNew Duty to Blow the Whistle on Its Client,N.Y. L.J.,
June 12, 1996, at 3 ("One of the main attractions in the [Reform] [A]ct for accountants ... was
Congress's substitution of a proportionate liability standard for the previous joint and several liability
that auditors... faced in securities litigation").
8. See generally Expanding Auditor Responsibility: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Telecomms. andFin. ofthe House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong. (1990) [hereinafter
Auditor Responsibility Hearing]; SEC and CorporateAudits: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Oversightand Investigationsofthe House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, PartsI-VI, 99th Cong.
(1985-1986) [hereinafter CorporateAudits Hearings];see also infra Part V.
9. The auditor may issue one of four types of opinions at the conclusion of an audit. These
include (1) an unqualified opinion ("standard" or "clean audit" opinion); (2) a qualified opinion;
(3) an adverse opinion; or (4) a disclaimer of opinion. See CODiCATION OF ACCouNTING
STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 58, § 508 (American Inst. of

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1997

3

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 4 [1997], Art. 5
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:1261

on the reliability of the company's financial statements.'" Indeed, the
impetus underlying much of Congress's scrutiny resulted from the

massive federal bailout of the savings and loan ("S&L") industry that
occurred in the 1980s." During these hearings, both the legislature and

the public attributed these business failures, in part, to deficiencies in the
audit process. The criticism was aimed at the independent auditors who
should have detected and prevented fraudulent financial reporting by their
clients' management or, alternatively, should have recognized and warned
against the existence
of certain risk factors predictive of a company's
2
ultimate failure.'

Prior to the passage of section 10A of the Reform Act, Congress left
the accounting profession with the responsibility of promulgating auditing
standards. However, on the heels of both the massive federal bailout of
S&L institutions and the resulting financial burden placed on the

taxpayers, Congress quickly lost patience with the accounting profession.
In particular, Congress believed that better detection of corporate fraud
and earlier notification by the auditor to the SEC would have significant-

Certified Pub. Accountants 1995) [hereinafter Statement on Auditing Standards]. An unqualified
opinion provides that the "financial statements present fairly, in all material respects, an entity's
financial position, results of operations, and cash flows in conformity with generally accepted
accounting principles." Id. § 508.07. A qualified opinion provides that "exceptfor the effects of the
matter to which the qualification relates," the financial statements are presented fairly, in all material
respects, in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles. Id. § 508.38. An adverse
opinion "is expressed when, in the auditor's judgment, the financial statements taken as a whole are
not presented fairly in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles." Id. § 508.67. A
disclaimer of opinion provides "that the auditor does not express an opinion on the financial statements." Id. § 508.70. This primarily occurs "when the auditor has not performed an audit sufficient
in scope to enable him to form an opinion on the financial statements." Id.
10. See William Steinberg, Washington; Cooked Books, ATLANTIC, Jan. 1992, at 20.
11. See Auditor Responsibility Hearing, supra note 8, at 1; H.R. REP. No. 102-890 (1992).
Congress closely examined accounting and auditing problems associated with the failures of a
number of financial and nonfinancial institutions, including E.S.M. Government Securities Inc.
(government securities dealer); American Savings and Loan Association of Florida, Home State
Savings and Loan of Ohio, Beverly Hills Savings and Loan Association, and Lincoln Savings and
Loan (S&L institutions); ZZZZ-Best Company (carpet cleaning company); and Mission Insurance
Company, Transit Casualty Company, and First Executive Corporation (insurance companies). See
id. at 8-11; see also 141 CONG. REc. H2844 (daily ed. March 8, 1995); A.A. Sommer, Jr., The
PrivateSecuritiesLitigationReform Act of1995-A Summary, Q247 ALI-ABA 483, 491-92 (1996).
12. See 141 CONG. RIc. H14049 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1995) ("I am of the view ... that had
[these audit requirements] been in effect in America, Charles Keating could have been stopped in
his tracks cold. Because in the Keating case, the auditors had the goods. And instead of reporting
the fraud, they simply shrunk away." (statement of then Rep. Wyden)); 141 CONG. REC. H2846-47
(daily ed. March 8, 1995) (statement of Rep. Wyden); see also Joseph I. Goldstein & Catherine
Dixon, New Teeth for the Public's Watchdog: The Expanded Role of the Independent Accountant
in Detecting Preventing,and ReportingFinancialFraud,44 BUs. LAW. 439, 441 (1989).
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ly reduced3 the losses absorbed by both the federal government and the
taxpayer.
The immediate by-product of section 10A is the auditor's assumption of a role analogous to that of a detective, charged with the
responsibility to "ferret out fraud"'4 and other illegal acts. Moreover, the
auditor has a concomitant duty to report to the SEC those instances of
management fraud that have a material effect on the company's financial
statements.
Although the accounting profession currently has standards that
address the auditor's responsibility with respect to fraud and illegal
acts, 5 the auditor is not trained to function as a "fraud detective."
Consequently, section 10A misses the mark in that the auditor has
minimal experience with this new requirement and it provides the auditor
with little, if any, guidance in carrying out these enhanced audit
responsibilities. This will force the auditor to expend additional resources
in satisfying the requirements 6f section 10A, resulting in a reduction in
audit procedures performed in other areas or a significant increase in
audit fees. However, given the client's anticipated reluctance to absorb
this additional expense and the narrow timeframe already faced by the
auditor in issuing the audit opinion, section 10A will likely have a
negative impact on the overall quality of audits and create tension in the
auditor-client relationship.
Part II of this Note analyzes the statutory text of section 10A and
identifies certain issues with respect to the enhanced audit procedures and
reporting requirements that now confront the auditor. Part HI examines
the role of the independent accountant in the audit of an issuer's financial
statements, as defined in the accountant's professional literature and as
perceived by both Congress and the public. Part IV sets forth the
auditor's existing responsibilities with respect to illegal acts, related
parties, and a going concern evaluation. Part V provides an historical
13. See Auditor Responsibility Hearing,supra note 8, at 1-6. The estimates for the ultimate

cost of the S&L bailout have ranged from $500 billion to $700 billion. See, e.g., Reuters, Cost of
S&L Bailout May Reach $600 Billion, CIIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Oct. 1, 1990, at 9.
The Government Accounting Office, in a 1989 study of 11 failed S&Ls, found that in more
than half of those cases, "CPA's did not adequately audit and/or report the S&Ls' financial or

internal control problems in accordance with professional standards:' U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, CPA AUDIT QUALITY: FAILURES OF CPA AuDITS TO IDENTIFY AND REPORT SIGNIFICANT
SAVINGS AND LOANS PROBLEMS 1 (1989). The report further found that before these 11 S&Ls failed,
their most recent audit reports showed a positive net worth of $44 million; yet, less than 18 months
later when these institutions failed, they had a combined negative net worth of $1.5 billion. See id.
14. Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449,454 (7th Cir. 1982).
15. See infra Part IV.
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overview of the Reform Act from its inception with respect to audit and
reporting requirements. Part VI assesses the implications of section 10A
of the Reform Act on both the audit engagement and the users of audited
financial statements. Part VII addresses recent efforts undertaken by the
accounting profession to enhance its ability to detect fraud during an
audit. Part VIII concludes with a discussion of whether section 10A of
the Reform Act will meet its prescribed objectives, namely, more
accurate financial reporting and more timely reporting of management
fraud and illegal acts to the SEC.
II.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS OF SECTION

10A

The Reform Act's statutory audit requirements were codified by
adding section 10A to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Securities
Exchange Act").' 6 The Reform Act divides the auditor's responsibilities
16. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (Supp. 11995). The fraud detection and disclosure requirements amend
the Securities Exchange Act by inserting the following new section:
§ 78j-1. Audit Requirements
(a) In general
Each audit required pursuant to this chapter of the financial statements of an
issuer by an independent public accountant shall include, in accordance with generally
accepted auditing standards, as may be modified or supplemented from time to time by
the Commission(1) procedures designed to provide reasonable assurance of detecting illegal acts
that would have a direct and material effect on the determination of financial statement
amounts;
(2) procedures designed to identify related party transactions that are material to
the financial statements or otherwise require disclosure therein; and
(3) an evaluation of whether there is substantial doubt about the ability of the
issuer to continue as a going concern during the ensuing fiscal year.
(b) Required response to audit discoveries
(1) Investigation and report to management
If, in the course of conducting an audit pursuant to this chapter to which
subsection (a) of this section applies, the independent public accountant detects or
otherwise becomes aware of information indicating that an illegal act (whether or not
perceived to have a material effect on the financial statements of the issuer) has or may
have occurred, the accountant shall, in accordance with generally accepted auditing
standards, as may be modified or supplemented from time to time by the Commission(A)(i) determine whether it is likely that an illegal act has occurred; and
(ii) if so, determine and consider the possible effect of the illegal act on
the financial statements of the issuer, including any contingent monetary effects,
such as fines, penalties, and damages; and
(B) as soon as practicable, inform the appropriate level of management
of the issuer and assure that the audit committee of the issuer, or the board of
directors ofthe issuer in'the absence of such a committee, is adequately informed
with respect to illegal acts that have been detected or have otherwise come to the
attention of such accountant in the course of the audit, unless the illegal act is
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clearly inconsequential.
(2) Response to failure to take remedial action
If, after determining that the audit committee of the board of directors of
the issuer, or the board of directors of the issuer in the absence of an audit
committee, is adequately informed with respect to illegal acts that have been
detected or have otherwise come to the attention of the accountant in the course
of the audit of such accountant, the independent public accountant concludes
that(A) the illegal act has a material effect on the financial statements of the
issuer,
(B) the senior management has not taken, and the board of directors has
not caused senior management to take, timely and appropriate remedial actions
with respect to the illegal act; and
(C) the failure to take remedial action is reasonably expected to warrant
departure from a standard report of the auditor, when made, or warrant
resignation from the audit engagement;
the independent public accountant shall, as soon as practicable, directly report its
conclusions to the board of directors.
(3) Notice to Commission; response to failure to notify
An issuer whose board of directors receives a report under paragraph (2)
shall inform the Commission by notice not later than 1 business day after the
receipt of such report and shall furnish the independent public accountant making
such report with a copy of the notice furnished to the Commission. If the
independent public accountant fails to receive a copy of the notice before the
expiration of the required 1-business-day period, the independent accountant
shall-(A) resign from the engagement; or
(B) furnish to the Commission a copy of its report (or the documentation
of any oral report given) not later than 1 business day following such failure to
receive notice.
(4) Report after resignation
If an independent public accountant resigns from an engagement under
paragraph (3)(A), the accountant shall, not later than 1 business day following the
failure by the issuer to notify the Commission under paragraph (3), furnish to the
Commission a copy of the accountant's report (or the documentation of any oral
report given).
(c) Auditor liability limitation
No independent public accountant shall be liable in a private action for any
finding, conclusion, or statement expressed in a report made pursuant to paragraph (3)
or (4) of subsection (b) of this section, including any rule promulgated pursuant thereto.
(d) Civil penalties in cease-and-desist proceedings
If the Commission finds, after notice and opportunity for hearing in a proceeding
instituted pursuant to section 78u-3 of this title, that an independent public accountant has
willfully violated paragraph (3) or (4) of subsection (b) of this section, the Commission
may, in addition to entering an order under section 78u-3 of this title, impose a civil
penalty against the independent public accountant and any other person that the
Commission finds was a cause of such violation. The determination to impose a civil
penalty and the amount of the penalty shall be governed by the standards set forth in
section 78u-2 of this title.
(e) Preservation of existing authority
Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section, nothing in this section shall
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into two main categories: procedures for conducting the audit and
required responses to audit discoveries. With respect to the former, audits
of an issuer's financial statements by an independent public accountant
must include
(1) procedures designed to provide reasonable assurance of
detecting illegal acts that would have a direct and material effect on the
determination of financial statement amounts;
(2) procedures designed to identify related party transactions that
are material to the financial statements or otherwise require disclosure
[in the financial statements]; and
(3) an evaluation of whether there is substantial doubt about the
ability of the issuer to continue as a going concern during the ensuing
fiscal year. 7
Auditors of public companies are already required to perform such
procedures under generally accepted auditing standards. Given the
history of business failures and investor losses accompanied by
unqualified or "clean" audit opinions, courts are likely to severely
scrutinize the auditor's responsibilities where such losses were attributable to management fraud.
While section 10A codifies much of what was already required in
the professional literature, 9 its effect may nonetheless prove to be quite
significant in future litigation affecting the accountant. By creating
certain statutory duties, it was the intention of Congress to force the
auditor to take his role in the identification and reporting of fraud more
seriously.20
be held to limit or otherwise affect the authority of the Commission under this chapter.
(f) "Illegal act" defined
As used in this section, the term "illegal act" means an act or omission that
violates any law, or any rule or regulation having the force of law.
Id.
17. Id. § 78j-l(a)(1)-(3).
18. See Statement on Auditing Standards, supra note 9, No. 53, § 316; No. 54, § 317; No. 45,
§ 334; No. 59, § 341.
19. See Andrea R. Andrews & Gilbert Simonetti, Jr., Tort Reform Revolution, J. ACCT., Sept.
1996, at 53, 55; Phillips & Miller, supra note 3, at 1062; Andrew J. Pincus, The Reform Act: What
CPAs Should Know, J. Accr., Sept. 1996, at 55, 58. In legislation proposed before the enactment
of section 1OA of the Reform Act, Congress intended the auditor's statutory duties to also include
separate tests and a report on the company's internal control structure (policies and procedures
established to provide reasonable assurance that the financial statements are accurately and fairly
presented). See infra Part V.
20. See FinancialFraudDetection:HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Telecomms. and Fin. of
the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong. 76 (1993) [hereinafter FinancialFraud
DetectionHearing](statement ofRep. Markey, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Telecommunica-
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Although section 10A directs auditors to discharge these responsibilities in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards

("GAAS"),2' it specifically authorizes that such standards "may be
modified or supplemented from time to time by the [SEC]. ' 2 While the
House Conference Report indicates that the SEC should not exercise this
authority "until after it has determined that the private sector is unable
or unwilling to do so on a timely basis,"' the express congressional
authority to supplement auditing standards may enhance the SEC's
influence over the development of those standards by the accounting

profession.24
The Reform Act also alters the relationship between public
companies and their auditors by requiring the latter to take specific action
if they learn during an audit that a client may have committed an illegal
act.' In such cases, and regardless of the perceived impact or materiali-

tions and Finance).
Similar statutory action was recently taken when President Clinton signed a law that would
codify accounting standards set by the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board. See Clinton
Signs New Federal Agency Audit Bill, J. ACCT., Dec. 1996, at 13, 13 (noting that the Federal
Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996 was passed in order to assure that all federal
agencies implement and maintain financial management systems that comply with uniform federal
accounting standards). This Act is intended to assist Congress in evaluating federal programs and
agencies which are the financial responsibility of the federal government. See id.
21. See infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
22. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(a), (b)(1).
23. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-369, at 48 (1995). While never expressly stated, the SEC has
long believed that it already had the authority to modify or promulgate auditing standards. See
FinancialFraudDetection Hearing,supra note 20, at 74-75 (testimony of Richard C. Breeden,
Chairman, SEC). This is consistent with the broad powers given to the SEC under the various federal
laws. See VINcENT M. O'REILLY ET AL., MONTGOMERY'S AUDriTNG 35-36 (11th ed. 1990). As a
general rule, the accounting profession has maintained that the SEC does not prescribe the audit
procedures employed by independent public accountants in their audit of a company's financial
statements. The SEC has traditionally relied on the public accounting profession to establish such
auditing standards. See RONALD J.MURRAY ET AL., THE COOPERS & LYBRAND SEC MANUAL 23
(6th ed. 1993). The SEC's official position in this area has generally remained unchanged since
1940. See id. (noting that, in accordance with SEC Accounting Series Release 19, "[u]ntil experience
should prove the contrary, we feel that [auditing standards promulgated by the accounting profession
are] preferable'); see also Goldstein & Dixon, supra note 12, at 441 n.7. But see Auditor
Responsibility Hearing,supra note 8, at 22 ("The [SEC] also has a significant statutory role to play
in the process of setting auditing standards and in establishing reporting requirements which we
believe should be pursued more actively." (statement of the Hon. Charles A. Bowsher, Comptroller
General of the United States) (emphasis added)).
24. See infra Part VI.
25. Section 1OA(f) of the Reform Act defines the term illegal act as "an act or omission that
violates any law, or any rule or regulationhaving the force of law." 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(f) (emphasis
added). Illegal acts are specifically defined by the auditing standards as "violations of laws or
governmental regulations" by the client on behalf of the entity and related to its business activities.
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ty of the illegal act on the client's financial statements, the auditor must
(i) determine whether it is likely that an illegal act has occurred; and
(ii) if so, determine and consider the possible effect of the illegal act
on the financial statements of the issuer, including any contingent
monetary effects, such as fines, penalties, and damages; and
([iii]) as soon as practicable, inform the appropriate level of the
management of the issuer and assure that the audit committee of the
issuer,"6 or the board of directors of the issuer in the absence of such
a committee, is adequately informed with respect to illegal acts that
have been detected or have otherwise come to the attention of such
accountant in the course of the audit, unless the illegal act is clearly
inconsequential.27
At this point, management has the opportunity to take remedial action
without further reporting to the board of directors or to the SEC.
If the audit committee of the board of directors fails to take
appropriate action upon learning of illegal acts that are judged by the
auditor to have a material 8 effect on the financial statements, the
Reform Act requires the auditor to report this information.2 9 Conversely,
this requirement is not currently mandated or contemplated under GAAS.
If, however, (i) the illegal act has a material effect on the issuer's
financial statements; (ii) senior management has failed to take timely and
appropriate remedial action with respect to the illegal act; and (iii) the
failure to take remedial action is reasonably expected to warrant
departure from the standard audit report or the auditor's resignation
from the audit engagement, then the auditor must report his conclusions
directly to the board of directors."
Once the auditors report to the board of directors that remedial
action has not been taken either by the audit committee or client

Statement on Auditing Standards, supra note 9, No. 54, § 317.02. The statutory and accounting
profession's definitions of illegal acts appear to be consistent.
26. The audit committee, distinct from the board of directors and client management, is
typically comprised of outside directors and is responsible for retaining the auditor and maintaining
a continual communication with the auditor regarding financial, operational, and compliance-related
issues that arise during the audit engagement. Such a communication is required under the auditing
standards. See Statement on Auditing Standards, supranote 9, No. 61, § 380; see also O'REILLY ET
AL., supra note 23, at 164-66, 629-30.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(b)(l)(A)-(B).
28. While the Reform Act fails to specifically define this term, it is logical to assume that the
definition supplied in the accountant's professional literature should be applied. See infra note 43.
29. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(b)(2).
30. See supra note 9 for a brief discussion of the elements of a standard audit report.
31. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(b)(2)(A)-(C).
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management, the company must inform the SEC within one business day,
providing the auditor with a copy of such notice to the SEC.32 If,
however, the company fails to do so, and the auditor fails to receive a
copy of the board's notice to the SEC, the reporting obligation passes to
the auditor, who must then resign from the engagement or furnish the
SEC with a copy of his report the following day.33 If the auditor
chooses to resign from the audit engagement, his reporting responsibility
does not cease. 4 The auditor must still provide the SEC with a copy of
his report within one business day following the client's failure to do
5

SO.3

To encourage such early disclosure, the Reform Act specifically
precludes any private action against the auditor for any finding,
conclusion, or statement expressed in his report to the board of directors
or the SEC.36 In order to enforce the auditor's reporting duty, the SEC
is authorized to impose civil penalties against an auditor who willfully37
violates these reporting obligations. It is unlikely, however, that a
shareholder will be able to maintain a private cause of action against the
auditor in a case where the requisite notification to the SEC is not
made. 3
As noted, the Reform Act's audit requirements represent, in large
part, a statutory codification of existing auditing standards. The most
significant impact of the Reform Act lies in the effect it has on the
auditor's duty to report illegal acts to the board of directors and the
SEC. 39 The new audit detection and disclosure provisions appear to
make the independent auditor "adjuncts of the SEC's Enforcement Divi-

32. See id. § 78j-l(b)(3).
33. See id. § 78j-l(b)(3)(A)-(B).
34. See id. § 78j-l(b)(4).
35. See id.
36. See id. § 78j-l(c).
37. Recent cases challenge the SEC's broader construction of the term "willful" and instead
favor the application of a criminal intent standard. See Harvey L. Pitt et al., More Than "Classical
GAAS": Audits and Corporate Illegality Under the Litigation Reform Act, in 28TH ANNUAL
INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 1996, at 273 n.11 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course

Handbook Series No. B-962, 1996).
38. Section 203 of the Reform Act specifically provides that "[n]othing in [the Reform Act]
...
shall be deemed to create or ratify any implied private right of action." Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act § 203, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 Historical and Statutory Notes.
39. These enhanced reporting requirements were motivated by Congress's strong belief that
a substantial amount of the losses borne by the federal government in the S&L bailouts could have
been prevented by earlier disclosure of such problems by the independent auditor to the SEC. See
Auditor Responsibility Hearing,supra note 8, at 3-5.
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sion," creating serious implications on the structure of the audit and
the existing auditor-client relationship.4'

II.

THE ROLE OF THE CPA INTHE AUDIT OF A
COMPANY'S FINANcIAL STATEMENTS

As a CPA and former securities auditor at a "Big Six" accounting
this Author recalls the difficulty encountered when attempting to
explain the role of the CPA in the audit of a company's financial
statements. While many confuse this role with that of an auditor for the
Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"), an equal number are confused over the
purpose and scope of the audit. Specifically, there are conflicting views
as to whether an accountant owes ultimate allegiance to the public or to
firm,42

his client's management, as well as whether an audit can reasonably be
expected to assure the public that the financial statements are accurate.43

While the limitations of an audit are well-known to auditors, this is not
necessarily the case for the users" of audited financial information.
Often, the public operates under the mistaken assumption that the auditor

40. Phillips & Miller, supra note 3, at 1062.
41. See infra Part VI.
42. This phrase refers to the six largest accounting firms in the world and includes Arthur
Andersen & Co., Coopers & Lybrand, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG Peat Marwick,
and Price Waterhouse. This may change, however, to the "Big Five" as Coopers & Lybrand and
Price Waterhouse agreed to merge their worldwide practices, thus creating the world's largest
accounting firm. See Reed Abelson, Two ofthe Big Six in AccountingPlan to Form New No. 1,N.Y.

TIMES, Sept. 19, 1997, at Al.
43. See H.R. REP. No. 102-890, at 7 (1992). As evidence of this confusion, the accountants'
professional literature specifically cautions against such accuracy. See O'REILLY ET AL., supra note
23, at 17 ("No audit provides complete assurance that the financial statements are free from material
misstatement."); see also Goldstein & Dixon, supra note 12, at 441 (noting that an audit is not
designed to guarantee the reliability of corporate financial statements).
In the scope paragraph of the standard or unqualified audit opinion, it is explicitly required
that the auditor "plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the
financial statements are free of material misstatement" and in the opinion paragraph that the financial
statements are "present[ed] fairly, in all materialrespects... in conformity with generally accepted
accounting principles." Statement on Auditing Standards, supra note 9, No. 58, § 508.08(h)
(emphasis added). This language is intended to indicate that the financial information presented by
management and opined by the auditor is accurate within a range of acceptable limits. See id. No.
69, § 411.04.
The concept of materiality recognizes that some matters, either individually or in the
aggregate, are important for the fair presentation of the financial statements in accordance with
generally accepted accounting principles. See id.
No. 47, § 312.03.
44. This generally includes potential investors, lending institutions such as banks and insurance
companies, regulatory agencies such as the SEC and New York Stock Exchange, and the
management of the company.
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is responsible for identifying and disclosing all instances of fraudulent
financial reporting and illegal activities.' This perception is magnified
in cases where there is a business failure and both investors and creditors
suffer substantial losses.' The Supreme Court, however, has provided
its own interpretation and definitively held that an independent auditor's
ultimate allegiance belongs to the public. In United States v. Arthur
Young & Co.,47 Chief Justice Burger described the auditor's role as that
of a "public watchdog":
By certifying the public reports that collectively depict a corporation's
financial status, the independent auditor assumes apublic responsibility
transcending any employment relationship with the client. The independent public accountant performing this special function owes ultimate
allegiance to the corporation's creditors and stockholders, as well as to
the investing public. This "public watchdog" function demands that the
accountant maintain total independence from the client at all times and
requires complete fidelity to the public trust.'
This role of "public watchdog" has resulted in an exceptionally high
standard for the independent auditor to meet, thus creating a role akin to
that of a policeman. Often, this has led to an adversarial relationship
between the auditor and client management and has impaired the
auditor's ability to learn of and report a company's transactions to the
public. In order to apply the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
auditor's role, it is important to first understand the purpose of the audit
of a company's financial statements and the tools used by the auditor in
carrying out his responsibilities.
In general, an audit involves an objective verification of the
financial statements49 of an entity by obtaining and evaluating the

45. This misconception is commonly referred to as the "expectation gap." For a general
discussion of this topic, see O'RELLY ET AL., supranote 23, at 19. In 1988, the Auditing Standards
Board of the AICPA issued nine new auditing standards in an effort to narrow the expectation gap
and raise auditor performance and reporting standards. See id. at 20 (referring to Statement on
Auditing Standards Nos. 52-61); see also Goldstein & Dixon, supra note 12, at 442 ("Public
expectations of the independent auditor's performance nevertheless appear to exceed the scope of
those duties prescribed by law and professional standards governing the auditing function.").
46. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
47. 465 U.S. 805 (1984).
48. Id. at 817-18.
49. Although this Note addresses the financial statement audit, see supra note 4, it is also
common for the auditor to perform compliance (adherence to prescribed laws and regulations) and
operational (adherence to the entity's internal policies and procedures as well as recommendations
for improving the current systems) audits. For a discussion of the various types of audits, see
DONALD H. TAYLOR & WILLIAM GLEZEN, AUDITING: INTEGRATED CONCEPTS AND PROCEDURES 4-5
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underlying accounting records and other supporting evidence." The
accounting profession, however, sets limitations on the objective of the
audit. " Given this formalistic definition and the use of ambiguous

terminology such as "fairness" and "in all material respects,"52 it is easy
to understand the frustration of both Congress and the investor in light
of recent business failures. 3

The auditor plays an integral role in providing the capital markets
with some form of assurance that business enterprises accurately and
fairly report information that the investor perceives as credible. 4

Without such investor confidence, the markets would suffer, the cost of
capital formation would increase significantly, and the value of the

auditor would diminish. It is vital, therefore, that the expectation gap that
currently exists be narrowed. Equally important is that the public obtain
a greater understanding of the scope and limitations of the audit. This
problem is magnified in cases where accounting firms are forced to settle
claims rather than engage in the difficult task of explaining the responsi-

bilities of an auditor to a jury.55 A greater understanding begins with an
examination of generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP"),
GAAS, and interpretations on GAAS, collectively termed Statements on
Auditing Standards. 6
(6th ed. 1994).
50. See TAYLOR & GLEZEN, supra note 49, at 3. The legal profession generally defines the
audit as the "systematic inspection of accounting records involving analyses, tests, and confirmations." BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 131 (6th ed, 1990).
51. "The objective of the ordinary audit of financial statements by the independent auditor is
the expression of an opinion on the fairness with which [the financial statements] present, in all
material respects, financial position, results of operations, and its cash flows in confornity with
generally accepted accounting principles." Statement on Auditing Standards, supra note 9, No. 1,
§ 110.01.
52. Id. No. 58, § 508.08.
53. An important distinction to be made, and which is too often overlooked, is that the
financial statements are the responsibility of the company and prepared by the company's
management. See id. No. 1, § 110.02. The auditor's responsibility, however, is confined to the
expression of an opinion on such financial statements. See id. For a general discussion of these
various opinions, see supra note 9.
54. See Auditor Responsibility Hearing,supra note 8,at 99 (statement of Donald L. Neebes,
Chairman of the Auditing Standards Board of the AICPA).
55. See Securities LitigationReform: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Telecomms. and Fin.
of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong. 191 (1994) [hereinafter Securities
LitigationReform Hearings]("It is virtually impossible for [auditors] to explain our responsibilities
effectively to a jury of our peers." (statement of J. Michael Cook, Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer, Deloitte & Touche)).
56. The phrase "generally accepted" connotates the uniform acceptance and use of established
accounting and auditing standards by all members of the accounting profession during all audit
engagements.
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GAAP constitutes the convention, rules, and procedures necessary
to define accepted accounting practice at a particular time.57 The use of
GAAP in the preparation of financial statements provides a standard by
which financial presentations can be measured." In effect, it ensures
that all financial statements are prepared under the same "rules," thus
allowing investors to make informed decisions based on comparable
information. Although the SEC has the authority to promulgate GAAP,
it has traditionally been the responsibility of the accounting profession,"
carried out under the authority of the AICPA's Financial Accounting
Standards Board."
GAAS6 constitutes the minimum measures of the quality of the
auditor's performance.62 In general terms, these standards represent a
measure of performance and quality set by a profession in recognition of
the public's interest and reliance on the professional's work. GAAS
broadly defines the nature and extent of the auditor's responsibilities and
provides guidance to the auditor in carrying out his duties. The responsibility for the promulgation of such auditing standards rests with the
AICPA's Auditing Standards Board, with general oversight performed by
the SEC.63

While GAAS establishes specific standards to guide professional
conduct, it is not to be considered a substitute for the auditor's exercise
of his own professional judgment. Clearly, GAAS cannot be expected to

encompass all of the possible situations which naturally arise given
today's complex business transactions. It is therefore intended to provide

a floor, below which the auditor should not perform, and to assist the
auditor when making judgments regarding the audit.' 4

57. See Statement on Auditing Standards, supranote 9, No. 69, § 411.02.
58. See id.
59. See infra note 236.
60. See O'REILLY ET AL., supra note 23, at 20.
61. GAAS represents the ten broad auditing standards adopted by the AICPA in 1948.
Interpretations of these original ten standards are set out in the Statements on Auditing Standards.
See id. at 34-35. Throughout this Note, however, GAAS will refer collectively to GAAS and its
interpretations, namely, the Statements on Auditing Standards.
62. See id. at 44-45.

at 34-35.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 45.
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IV. THE AUDITOR'S GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES
CONCERNING ILLEGAL ACTS, RELATED PARTIES,
AND A GOING CONCERN EVALUATION

A. Illegal Acts
The auditor's responsibilities with respect to illegal acts 65 contribute
more to the expectation gap than any other auditing standard. Specifically, the auditor has an affirmative duty to design the audit to provide
reasonable assurance of detecting those illegal acts that have a direct and
material effect on the company's financial statements. 7 This process
begins with the auditor's preliminary assessment of the risk that such
illegal acts exist and whether these acts will cause a material misstatement.6 8 Although characteristics69 indicating the likelihood of such
65. The term "illegal act" is defined in the auditing standards as "violations of laws or
governmental regulations." Statement on Auditing Standards, supra note 9, No. 54, § 317.02, For
a comparison of this definition to that supplied under the Reform Act, see supra note 25.
Currently, the professional literature addresses the auditor's responsibilities for errors and
irregularities together. See Statement on Auditing Standards, supra note 9, No. 53, § 316. While
errors are unintentional misstatements, irregularities are defined as intentional misstatements and
generally include management fraud, e.g., fraudulent financial reporting, and theft or misappropriation of the company's assets. See id §§ 316.02-.03. The auditor's responsibility with respect to
illegal acts is addressed separately. See id. No. 54, § 317. For a detailed analysis of the auditor's
duty with respect to illegal acts, see Donald L, Neebes et al., Illegal Acts: What Are the Auditor's
Responsibilities?,J. ACCr., Jan. 1991, at 82, 82-93.
66. See Auditor Responsibility Hearing, supra note 8, at 108 (noting that Statement on
Auditing Standards Nos. 53 and 54 "taken together represent the heart of the profession's efforts to
close the expectation gap between auditor performance and the public's expectations" (statement of
Donald L. Neebes, Chairman, Auditing Standards Board of the AICPA)).
67. See Statement on Auditing Standards, supra note 9, No. 54, § 317.05. The auditor's
responsibilities with respect to illegal acts are generally the same as that for errors and irregularities.
See id; see also id No. 53, §§ 316.01-.34. For a general discussion on the relationship between
illegal acts and errors and irregularities under the professional literature, see O'REILLY ET AL., supra
note 23, at 20. Because the standards apply to errors and irregularities, and illegal acts are closely
related, they will be addressed together for the purposes of this discussion.
68. See Statement on Auditing Standards, supranote 9, No. 54, § 317.07; see also id. No. 53,
§ 316.10.
69. These are segmented into three principal areas: (i) management characteristics,
(ii) operating and industry characteristics, and (iii) engagement characteristics. See id. No. 53,
§ 316.10. Management characteristics focus on the degree and manner of management review and
whether there is an undue emphasis on meeting earnings projections. Operating and industry
characteristics focus on the company's profitability compared to other businesses within the same
industry, recent economic trends within the company and the general industry, and whether matters
exist that raise doubt about the company's ability to continue as a going concern. See id.
Engagement characteristics focus on the existence of serious accounting disagreements, difficulties
in auditing specific balances or transactions, and significant related party transactions. See id.; see
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misstatements and possible illegal acts" are detailed in the professional
literature, this listing is not all-inclusive and offers no guarantee that an
audit performed in accordance with GAAS will in fact detect such illegal
acts.7
When the auditor becomes aware of information concerning a
possible illegal act, the auditor should obtain an understanding of the act,
the surrounding circumstances in which it occurred, and any other
information necessary to evaluate its potential effect on the financial
statements.7 This evaluation involves considerations of both the
qualitative and quantitative effects on materiality, including contingent
monetary effects such as fines, penalties, and damages.7' The evaluation
also seeks to determine whether the financial statements contain the
appropriate disclosures.74 The auditor is required to assure himself that
the audit committee, or others of equivalent authority, is adequately
informed with respect to such illegal acts.7
The auditor's final, and perhaps most significant, responsibility
involves how the auditor is to deal with those illegal acts that are
discovered. If the auditor concludes that an illegal act has a material
effect on the financial statements, and the act has not been properly
accounted for or disclosed, the auditor should express a qualified or
adverse opinion.76 This will result in notification to the SEC after the
audited financial statements are filed. If the client refuses to accept the
auditor's qualified or adverse opinion, the auditor is required to take the
extreme step of withdrawing from the audit engagement. 7 It is likely,

also supra note 18.
70. These generally include unauthorized or improperly recorded transactions, investigations
by governmental or regulatory agencies, excessive or unexplained payments for services or goods,
failure to file tax returns, and unexplained banking transactions. See Statement on Auditing
Standards, supra note 9, No. 54, § 317.09.

71. See id. § 317.07.
72. See id, This would include all possible illegal acts, whether first perceived to be material
or not. See id.; see also Auditor ResponsibilityHearing, supra note 8, at 112.
73. See Statement on Auditing Standards, supra note 9, No. 54, §§ 317.13-.14.

74.
75.
76.
77.

See id. § 317.15.
See id. § 317.17.
See id. § 317.18.
See id. § 317.20. Such a withdrawal would result in the company notifying the SEC under

the SEC's Form 8-K reporting process, which mandates that the company notify the SEC of any
change in its auditors and indicate the reasons for such change. See MURRAY ET AL., supra note 23,
at 286. The AICPA's SEC Practice Section requires the auditor to notify a client that is an SEC
registrant in writing within five business days of the end of its relationship. A copy of this
notification is also required to be sent to the SEC. See id. at 926. For a discussion of congressional
concerns with regard to this reporting process, see infra note 131.
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however, that the auditor's responsibilities with respect to illegal acts will
be enhanced under section 10A of the Reform Act.78
B. Related Parties
The auditor is required to plan the audit in order to obtain reasonable assurance that all material related party79 transactions are appropriately accounted for and disclosed." In general, the risk associated with

such transactions is that they may not have been executed at "arm'slength"' and therefore, the substance of the transaction may not be
accurately reflected in the company's financial statements.82 In essence,
such transactions are more likely to be misstated because one of the
parties may have exerted influence over the other based on the close
nature of their relationship.83 While an audit performed in accordance

78. See infra Part VI.F and accompanying notes.
79. The accounting literature defines "related parties" as
[a]ffiliates of the enterprise; entities for which investments are accounted for by the
equity method by the enterprise; trusts for the benefit of employees, such as pension and
profit-sharing trusts that are managed by or under the trusteeship of management;
principal owners of the enterprise; its management; members of the immediate families
of principal owners of the enterprise and its management; and other parties with which
the enterprise may deal if one party controls or can significantly influence the
management or operating policies of the other to an extent that one of the transacting
parties might be prevented from fully pursuing its own separate interests. Another party
is also a related party if it can significantly influence the management or operating
policies of the transacting parties or if it has an ownership interest in one of the
transacting parties and can significantly influence the other to an extent that one or more
of the transacting parties may be prevented from fully pursuing its own separate interests.
RELATED PARTY DISCLOSURES, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 57, § 24f
(Financial Accounting Standards Bd. 1982) [hereinafter RELATED PARTY DISCLOSURES].
80. See Statement on Auditing Standards, supra note 9, No. 45, § 334.04.
81. Transactions which may be indicative of the existence of related parties generally include
(i) "[b]orrowing or lending on an interest-free basis or at a rate of interest significantly above or
below market rates prevailing at the time of the transaction"; (ii) "[s]elling real estate at a price that
differs significantly from its appraised [market] value"; (iii) "[e]xchanging property for similar
property in a nonmonetary transaction"; and (iv) "[m]aking loans with no scheduled terms for when
or how the funds will be'repaid." Id § 334.03.
82. The professional literature appears to offer differing presumptions about such transaetions.
As stated in the auditing standards, "[i]n the absence of evidence to the contrary, transactions with
related parties should not be assumed to be outside the ordinary course of business." Id. § 334.06
(emphasis added). However, under the accounting standards, "transactions involving related parties
cannot be presumed to be carried out on an arm's-length basis, as the requisite conditions of
competitive, free-market dealings may not exist." RELATED PARTY DISCLOSURES, supra note 79, § 3.
The auditor, however, is required to follow the former definition under GAAS and the latter
definition under GAAP.
83. The existence of such a related party relationship was evidenced by the failure of Lincoln
Savings & Loan, where Lincoln Savings was a wholly owned subsidiary of American Continental
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with GAAS cannot necessarily detect all material related party transactions,' the auditing literature provides some guidance by detailing those

conditions which may give rise to such transactions."

If, as a result of performing specified auditing procedures,86 a

related party transaction is discovered, the auditor must determine
whether the transaction has a material effect on the financial statements87 and be satisfied that it has been adequately disclosed. 8 This
generally includes the nature of the relationship and a description and
dollar amount of the transaction, as it effects both the income statement
and balance sheet.8 If management fails to make such a disclosure, or
the existing disclosure is judged to be inadequate or unsubstantiated, the
auditor should express a qualified or adverse opinion because such failure
constitutes a departure from GAAP. In such a case, the audit report
would have to reflect the undisclosed material related party transaction.9
C. Going Concern Evaluation
The auditor is required to make an evaluation about whether there
is substantial doubt92 about a company's ability to continue as a going

Corporation, which was controlled by Charles Keating. See PrivateLitigation Under the Federal
Securities Laws: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. 404 (1993) [hereinafter Private Litigation Hearings]
(testimony of Melvyn I. Weiss, Partner, Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Hynes & Lerach). Specifically,
there was an alleged "bogus tax-sharing agreement between Lincoln and its parent, American
Continental Corporation." H.R. REP. No. 102-890, at 9 (1992). Transactions between a parent and
its subsidiaries are examples of such related party transactions. See RELATED PARTY DISCLOSURES,
supra note 79, § I; see also Statement on Auditing Standards, supra note 9, No. 45, § 334.07. For
a general discussion of related parties, see O'REILLY, supra note 23, at 218-19.
84. See Statement on Auditing Standards, supra note 9, No. 45, § 334.04.
85. These include (i) a lack of working capital or credit, (ii) an overly favorable earnings
forecast or projection, (iii) a general decline in the industry, (iv) significant litigation, and
(v) dependence on a single or relatively few product lines. See id.§ 334.06.
86. The literature provides a list of procedures to assist the auditor in identifying the existence
of such transactions. See id. §§ 334.07-.08.
87. See id. §§ 334.09-.10.
88. See id. §§ 334.11-.12.
89. See RELATED PARTY DISCLOSURES, supra note 79, § 2.
90. See Statement on Auditing Standards, supra note 9, No. 45, § 334.12.
91. See id. No. 58, § 508.49.
92. Both the existing auditing literature and section 10A omit any definition or guidance in
assessing what constitutes "substantial doubt." See id. No. 59, § 341.02 (making reference to the
standard without any definition); 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(a)(3) (Supp. 11995).
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concern for a reasonable period of time,93 not to exceed one year.9 4
Ordinarily, a company is considered a "going concern" when it is able
to continue its business operations and meet its obligations in the
ordinary course of business.95 If, however, the company is able to meet
these obligations only by disposing of significant assets or by seeking a
restructuring or forgiveness of its existing debt, doubts should be raised
concerning the viability of the company. 6 In general, continuation of an
entity as a going concern is assumed in the financial statements in the
absence of contrary information.97
In planning the audit, the auditor is not required to design auditing
procedures specifically directed at going concern issues.98 Rather,
performance of those procedures related to the other audit objectives"
is usually sufficient in order to make such a determination. The professional literature, however, provides some guidance about conditions and
events which may alert the auditor to potential going concern issues.' 0
If, in the aggregate, issues identified during the audit causes the auditor
to believe that there is a substantial doubt of the company's viability, the
auditor has an affirmative duty to consider management's plans for
dealing with such adverse conditions and events.'0 Those plans might
include plans to dispose of certain assets or discontinue a line of
business, new financing or a restructuring of existing debt, reducing or

93. The auditing standard and section 10A make a distinction with regard to the period of time
covered by the auditor's evaluation. GAAS requires the evaluation to cover a "reasonable period of
time, not to exceed one year." Statement on Auditing Standards, supranote 9, No. 59, § 341.02. The
standard, however, does not offer guidance on what constitutes a "reasonable period of time."
Section 10A, however, requires the evaluation to cover "the ensuing fiscal year." 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j-l(a)(3).

94. See Statement on Auditing Standards, supra note 9, No. 59, § 341.02.
95. For a general discussion of the going concern evaluation, see O'REILLY ET AL., supranote
23, at 649-52.

96. See id. at 649.
97. See Statement on Auditing Standards, supra note 9, No. 59, § 341.01.
98. See id. § 341.05; see also O'REtLLY Er AL., supra note 23, at 650.
99. This typically includes analytical procedures, review ofsubsequent events, compliance with
debt and loan covenants, reviewing the minutes of the board of directors, inquiry of a company's
legal counsel about outstanding litigation, and third party confirmation concerning financing arrangements. See Statement on Auditing Standards, supra note 9, No. 59, § 341.05.
100. These include: (i) negative trends, e.g., recurring operating losses, negative cash flows, and
adverse financial ratios; (ii) general financial difficulties, e.g., default on loan or debt covenants, a
continued need for outside financing, disposition of substantial assets, and restructuring or

forgiveness of the company's outstanding debt; (iii) internal problems, e.g., labor disputes or other
work-related stoppages; and (iv) external matters, e.g., legal proceedings, loss of a significant

customer, supplier or business line, and business shutdowns. See id. § 341.06.
101. See id. § 341.07.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol25/iss4/5

20

Reiss: Powered by More Than GAAS: Section 10A of the Private Securities

19971

SECTION 1OA A CCOUNTANT LIABILITY

delaying its expenditures, or increasing the equity in the company
through new capital infusions or a reduction in its dividend payouts. 2
When evaluating the feasibility of such plans, the auditor should perform
additional procedures in order to obtain evidence to support those
assumptions that are critical to management's plans.0 3
If, after considering management's plans, the auditor still concludes
that there is substantial doubt as to the company's ability to continue as
a going concern, the audit report should be modified 1"4 to include an
explanatory paragraph addressing this issue."5 A qualified or adverse
opinion may, however, be appropriate if the auditor concludes that the
disclosures are inadequate and constitute a material departure from
106
GAAP.
Because much of Congress's focus was directed at illegal acts and
management fraud, and related parties and going concern considerations
received little, if any, attention during the hearings,0 7 it is unlikely that
the auditor's responsibilities in this area will significantly change under
section 10A of the Reform Act.
V.

THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION

A.

10A

99th and 100th Congress

In 1986, Congress introduced H.R. 4886,'08 the Financial Fraud
Detection and Disclosure Act of 1986, aimed at defining the auditor's
responsibilities in detecting and reporting financial fraud committed by
its publicly held clients.0 9 Proposed in response to the massive S&L

102. See id.
103. See id. §§ 341.08-.09.
104. In contrast to a qualified opinion, see supra note 9, such a modification is intended to
inform the reader, rather than qualify the auditor's opinion, see Statement on Auditing Standards,
supra note 9, No. 58, § 508.11 (d).
105. See id. No. 59, §§ 341.12-.13.
106. See id. § 341.14; see also id. No. 58, § 508.55.
107. See generallyAuditorResponsibilityHearingsupra
note 8; H.R. REP. No. 102-890 (1992).
108. See H.R. 4886, 99th Cong. (1986).
109. See generally Corporate Audits Hearings, supra note 8. The hearings held by the
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations in 1985-1986 represented a follow-up to hearings
chaired in the late 1970s by Senator Lee Metcalf and Representative John Moss. The hearings
followed the disclosure of financial problems at Penn Central Company and Lockheed Aircraft
Corporation resulting in federal bailout programs, the massive fraud at Equity Funding Corporation,
and other "widespread reports of corporate bribery and wrongdoing." H.R. REP. No. 102-890, at 7
n.11 (1992). The Metcalf subcommittee published a report in 1977 that made a series of
recommendations designed to meet congressional and public expectations of the accounting
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insolvencies in the 1980s, the bill was designed to "require audits
performed under the [f]ederal securities laws to include reasonable
procedures for financial fraud detection, and to require that auditors
report fraudulent activities to appropriate enforcement and regulatory
authorities.""' The significant provisions of the bill required the auditor
to detect "any illegal or irregular activity""' and evaluate and identify
weaknesses in the company's "internal accounting and administrative

profession. See Goldstein & Dixon, supra note 12, at 443. The report called for a strengthening of
the basic audit function and the avoidance of activities that appeared to conflict with the public's
expectations. See Improving theAccountability ofPublicly Owned Corporationsand TheirAuditors:
HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Reports, Accounting and Management of the Senate Comm. on
Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong. (1977) [hereinafter MetcalfReport]; Goldstein & Dixon, supra
note 12, at 443-44. Although the Metcalf Report declined to introduce corrective legislation, opting
to rely on the efforts of the accounting profession and SEC, the subcommittee outlined a number of
recommendations. These included a self-regulatory organization to evaluate and improve the quality
of work performed and the formation of independent audit committees designed to enhance corporate
accountability and have full authority over the hiring and compensation of the auditors. See Metcalf
Report, see also Goldstein & Dixon, supra note 12, at 444-45. Most notably, the Metcalf Report
recommended that independent auditors be required to report illegal activities to corporate audit
committees and appropriate government authorities, regardless of the materiality of such illegal acts
on the financial statements being audited. See id.; see also Goldstein & Dixon, supra note 12, at 444.
This recommendation represented the most substantial modification to the auditors' existing
responsibilities under the professional literature and was codified in the Reform Act. See Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 301(a), 109 Stat. 737, 762-64
(adding section 10A to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
During the Metcalfsubcommittee hearings, Representative John Moss commenced an inquiry
into the lack of public confidence in corporate accountability following the disclosure of illegal or
improper payments made by public corporations and with the knowledge of the independent auditor.
See Goldstein & Dixon, supra note 12, at 445. The Moss subcommittee published a report in 1976
providing that the "deficiencies" inherent in GAAS and the complex and multinational nature of
corporations have made the SEC's sole reliance on the private accounting profession insufficient to
protect public investors and to assure compliance with the federal securities laws. See Report on
Federal Regulation and Regulatory Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong. (1976). For
a more complete discussion of congressional inquiry into independent auditors and corporate
accountability, see Goldstein & Dixon, supra note 12, at 443-46.
110. H.R. 4886 Preamble. The sponsor of this legislation, Representative Wyden, stated that
[t]his legislation is designed to provide assurances to Congress and the public that illegal
and irregular activities ... will be discovered and reported to the proper regulatory
authorities by those in the best position to perform this vital function-independent
auditors.All too often ...independent auditors either have failed to detect or to report
fraudulent activities ....
132 CONG. REc. H1837 (daily ed. May 22, 1986) (emphasis added). More disturbing to Congress
was the fact that these illegalities and frauds resulted in the business failures that were "virtually on
the heels of [opinions] by audit firns that the companies were financially sound." Id.; see also
Goldstein & Dixon, supra note 12, at 493-500.
I1l. H.R. 4886, § 13A(b)(1) (emphasis added).
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controls..' .'2 The audit requirements addressing illegal acts drew a great
deal of adverse reaction from both the SEC and accounting profession
due to the absence of any materiality standard with respect to the
detection of such acts and the increased costs that would likely result
from such a requirement."1 Although the provisions requiring the

auditor to separately report on the client's internal control structure were
eventually omitted, the reaction was mixed when it was included as part
of the discussion draft issued in 1990.1' 4
Recognizing the concerns expressed by Congress and the public in
these hearings and legislation, the accounting profession conducted its
own investigation aimed at improving the credibility and reliability of the
existing financial reporting system." ' The Treadway Commission

recognized that although the integrity of the financial statements was the
responsibility of management, the independent auditor played a crucial
role in the financial reporting process." 6 The users of the financial
statements expected the auditors to perform the audit competently and

objectively and to search for and detect material misstatements in the

112. Id. § 13A(b)(2).
113. See Goldstein & Dixon, supra note 12, at 491-96.
114. The SEC indicated that such an audit requirement raised real concerns about the costs
involved and careful consideration would have to be given to whether the expected benefits would
justify these costs. See Auditor ResponsibilityHearing,supra note 8, at 88-89 (Discussion Draft of
July 30, 1990) ("Almost all of the commentators addressing this [audit requirement) issue opposed
such direct auditor reporting, largely due to concerns about cost." (statement of James R. Doty,
General Counsel, SEC)).
The accounting profession indicated a far more favorable view on the benefits of such a
requirement. See id. at 103 ("The profession... believes that auditor reporting on management's
assessment of its internal control structure related to financial reporting... would add significant
benefit to the financial reporting process and, therefore, to investor protection." (statement of Donald
L. Neebes, Chairman, Auditing Standards Board of the AICPA)). The profession also noted that the
benefits associated with such a reporting requirement would exceed the costs incurred. See id. at 104
("[T]he need to strengthen investor confidence in the financial reporting system and the ancillary
benefits associated with the effective functioning of a well-conceived and [well]-maintained internal
control structure suggests that the benefits would exceed the marginalcosts incurred." (statement
of Donald L. Neebes, Chairman, Auditing Standards Board of the AICPA (emphasis added)).
115. See JAmES C. TREADWAY, JR., REPORT Of THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FRAUDULENT
FINANCIAL REPORTING (1987) [hereinafter TREADNWAY REPORT]. Chaired by James C. Treadway, Jr.,
former SEC Commissioner, the Treadway Commission analyzed current financial reporting systems
and the expectations of its users in an effort to identify the causes of fraudulent financial reporting
and to recommend solutions aimed at improving the accuracy and integrity of financial information
reported to the public. See id. at 1. Fraudulent financial reporting is defined as "intentional or
reckless conduct, whether an act or omission, that results in materially misleading financial
statements." IM at 2. For a detailed discussion on the findings and recommendations of the Treadway
Commission, see Goldstein & Dixon, supra note 12, at 468-74.
116. See TREADWAY REPORT, supra note 115, at 49.
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reported financial information." 7 These expectations are integral in
ensuring the credibility of our capital markets and maintaining investor
participation. In response to the findings and recommendations of the
Treadway Commission, the AICPA adopted nine new auditing standards
in 1988,"8 many of which are included in the audit requirements
outlined in the Reform Act."9

H.R. 5439, a modified version of H.R. 4886, was introduced in
1986.120 H.R. 5439 was designed to "require audits performed under the
Federal securities laws to include reasonable procedures for material

117. See id.The Treadway Report made a number of other recommendations regarding the
responsibilities of each participant in the financial reporting process. These participants include, for
example, the reporting company, the SEC, and the auditor. Regarding the reporting company, top
management should establish a formal set of policies, procedures, and written codes of conduct in
order to reduce the risk of fraudulent financial reporting. See id. at 33-36.
Recognizing the importance of the audit committee in preventing and detecting fraudulent
and illegal acts, the Treadway Commission recommended that all public companies form such
committees. See id. at 40. The audit committee would be responsible for assuring the independence
of the auditors, maintaining a constant communication with the auditors during the audit, and
ensuring that the company is operating in compliance with the internal policies and procedures. See
i at 42-44. In addition, the Treadway Commission recommended that the SEC require the reporting
company to acknowledge its responsibilities with respect to the financial statements and internal
controls in a separate report included in the audited annual report. See id. at 44-46. The report should
also indicate that recommendations made by the auditors were responded to by senior management.
See fi. It is interesting to note that while both the SEC and Treadway Commission did not
recommend that the independent auditor issue a separate report on the company's internal control
structure, the accounting profession advocated such a requirement. See id. at 58; Auditor
Responsibility Hearing,supra note 8, at 89 n.13; see also supra note 114.
With respect to the independent auditor, the Treadway Commission recommended the
establishment of auditing procedures aimed at reducing the risk of fraudulent financial reporting. See
TREADWAY REPORT, supra note 115, at 49-51. Specifically, the auditor should design procedures
to evaluate the risk of potential fraud and tests to provide reasonable assurance of detecting such
fraud and illegal acts. See id.This would include an assessment of the company's overall control
environment, i.e., those policies and procedures promulgated and carried out by management in order
to provide for accurate financial reporting, and a greater degree of skepticism of management's
integrity. See fi. The independent auditor, however, should clearly indicate in his audit report the
limitations associated with the audit and the inability of the auditor to guarantee the accuracy and
reliability of the financial statements. See id. at 57. Most notably, the Treadway Commission
recommended that the development of these standards be carried out by the Auditing Standards
Board of the AICPA, rather than by governmental agencies. See id. at 59-61. However, the SEC's
enforcement authority over persons involved in fraudulent financial reporting should be increased.
See fi. at 63-76.
118. See Statement on Auditing Standards, supranote 9, No. 53, § 316; No. 54, § 317; No. 55,
§ 319; No. 56, § 329; No. 57, § 342; No. 58, § 508; No. 59, § 341; No. 60, § 325; No. 61, § 380.
See generallyAuditor Responsibility Hearing,supra note 8, at 101.
119. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(a)(1)-(3), (b) (Supp. 11995). Specifically, section IOA(a)(1) codifies
Statement on Auditing Standards Nos. 53-54; section 1OA(a)(3) codifies Statement on Auditing
Standards No. 59; and section 1OA(b)(1)(B) codifies Statement on Auditing Standards No. 61.
120. See H.R. 5439, 99th Cong. (1986).
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financial fraud detection... and to require the reporting of fraudulent
activities to appropriate enforcement and regulatory authorities."'2
While the inclusion of a materiality standard represented a more
workable standard for the auditor than that provided by H.R. 4886, it was

still significantly broader than the materiality standard currently
employed in the existing professional literature." Specifically, a
transaction or event could be material based on its impact on a specific
line of business or subsidiary of the issuer, or if it presented an actual or

potential risk of serious damage to the issuer's reputation or standing."
Therefore, although H.R. 5439 placed some limitation on the auditor's
responsibilities with respect to illegal acts, it still obligated the auditor to
structure the audit to detect those acts which might not be material in a

financial statement audit." In hearings that began in the late 1980s and
continued into 1990, congressional scrutiny began to focus strongly on
the SEC's 8-K reporting process, which is triggered by, inter alia, a
change in the company's auditors."z
B.

101st Congress

In a discussion draft introduced in 1990, the auditor's responsibilities with respect to detecting material illegal acts were increased by a
broader definition of "illegality"'26 and the absence of any defined
121. Id. Preamble (emphasis added).
122. See id. § 13A(f)(4).
123. See id. § 13A(f)(4)(A), (B).
124. It appears from the language of the statute that an item which might be considered
immaterial in a company's consolidated financial statements might otherwise be considered material
when measured against a specific subsidiary's financial statement. Because the subsidiary will, in
all likelihood, report significantly lower balances than those reported by the parent company, this
will expand the scope of illegal acts that are judged to be material. In addition, standards such as
reputation and standing are highly subjective and arguably outside the scope of the auditor's
expertise and the general audit function.
125. See FinancialReportingPractices (Part2): HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Oversight
and Investigationsof the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong. (1988); Financial
Reporting Practices:HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong. (1987); see also supra note 77.
126. Under section 13A(g)(1) of the discussion draft, the term "illegality," rather than "illegal
acts," was defined as "any action or omission to act that violates any law, or any rule or regulation
having the force of law-(A) which relates to (i) financial transactions, or (ii) access to and
accountability for assets, or (B) the effect of which would have a material impact on such
transactions or assets." Auditor Responsibility Hearing,supra note 8, at 11 (emphasis added) (as
provided in the Discussion Draft of July 30, 1990). This definition would require the auditor to
design the audit with procedures to detect illegal acts that have a material and direct effect on the
financial statements and illegal acts which "relate to" or indirectly affect the financial statements.
See supra note 124.
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materiality standard. 27 In addition to the earlier requirement that the
auditor issue a separate report on the adequacy of the issuer's internal
control structure, 2 , the auditor now assumed additional responsibilities
for designing specific procedures pertaining to the related parties and the
going concern evaluation. 29 Perceived weaknesses in the scope and
timing of the SEC 8-K notification process 3 ° became the source of
significant debate with respect to the auditor's responsibility to timely
report illegal acts and fraud.' 3' Much of this scrutiny was the result of

127. The draft statute did, however, define "substantial," a term used in connection with those
illegal acts that are subsequently discovered during the course of the audit. See Auditor Responsibility Hearing,supra note 8, at 11-12. Therefore, the auditor is required to apply a different standard
with respect to procedures designed to detect illegal acts, i.e., material, and those procedures the
auditor must perform once an illegal act is detected, i.e., substantial. The term "substantial," as
applied to an illegality, means
that the particular illegality, or any pattern or practice of such illegalities, presents a risk
of financial loss (or of the failure to obtain a financial gain) that is(A) material in relation to the financial statements of the issuer, or
(B) to the extent required by [SEC] rule, material in relation to the financial statements
of any industry segment of the issuer (in which the risk occurs) or to the financial statements of any subsidiary or affiliate of the issuer (in which the risk occurs).
Id. Section (B) represented a carry-over of part of the definition of "material" as provided in H.R.
5439, now to be applied after, rather than before, an illegal act is discovered. See id.; H.R. 5439,
99th Cong. § 13A(f)(4)(A).
Given the statute's distinction between "material" and "substantial," it is clear that Congress
intended the standards to be different, and therefore, the auditor would likely apply the same
materiality standard that is currently provided in the auditing standards. See Statement on Auditing
Standards, supra note 9, No. 54, § 317.05.
128. See Auditor Responsibility Hearing, supra note 8, at 7-8 (as provided in the Discussion
Draft of July 30, 1990).
129. See id. at 9.
130. See supra note 77.
131. See Auditor Responsibility Hearing,supra note 8, at 37-38. There was a consensus that
the current 8-K report provided an inadequate means of notifying the SEC concerning illegalities and
frauds. See id. at 38 ("I'm just concerned that illegalities and frauds are not necessarily reportable
events under these 8-Ks, and particularly if you have a situation where it's a financial statement or
something and management says [the auditor is] fired and [the auditor] can't disagree with that."
(statement of Rep. Wyden)). A great deal of the frustration voiced by Congress related to the
absence of any disclosures in examined 8-Ks that addressed management fraud or illegal acts in
institutions where these acts caused business failure or collapse. See id. at 132 ("I want to be told
that these illegal acts are reportable events to the [SEC], specifically and directly. I can't find
anything that indicates that they are." (statement of Rep. Wyden) (emphasis added)). This was
exemplified by the ZZZZ-Best collapse where the company engaged in massive illegalities, and,
although an 8-K was filed by management after the auditor resigned, the accounting firm's response
was filed after the fraud had been exposed by the press, and the company declared bankruptcy many
days earlier. See H.R. REP. No. 102-890, at 9 (1992).
While recognizing the need for such information to get to its attention, the SEC has
expressed mixed views on the effectiveness of the current 8-K process. See Auditor Responsibility
Hearing, supra note 8, at 133 ("[]nquiries are taken seriously by good lawyers and good
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Congress's belief that had the accountants "sounded an early alarm about
[S&L] fraud, the billions that American taxpayers [had] to pay would
[have been] far less."''
The proposed discussion draft drew a mixed reaction from the
accounting profession and government agencies and regulators.'
Concerns were raised with respect to the adequacy of the auditor's
detection and reporting of management fraud and the ability of the
"' The Government
accounting profession to address these concerns. 34
Accounting Office ("GAO") advocated the broadest role for the auditor,
placing a greater responsibility on the auditor to evaluate and report on
management's internal control structure and compliance with laws and
regulations.' 35 In addition, the GAO recommended that the SEC play a
more active role in setting auditing standards'36 and a requirement that
registrants create independent audit committees.'37

accountants.... But I'm not quarreling with [Congress] that there's an issue here of how the
information gets to the [SEC]." (statement of James R. Doty, General Counsel, SEC)); see also
FinancialFraudDetection Hearing, supra note 20, at 21-24 (statement of Richard C. Breeden,
Chairman, SEC).
The accounting profession, however, contended that the current reporting process was
adequate. See Auditor Responsibility Hearing,supra note 8, at 134-36.
[D]irect notification to the client with a copy to the chief accountant [at the SEC is made
saying] that we are no longer auditors. That enables the SEC to make sure that an 8-K
describing the termination and the reason for it is filed timely, and then, after that, [the
auditor's] report. So if we disagree with management's description of the reason[s]...
we would communicate that agreement or disagreement in our letter that would be filed
with the SEC.
Id. at 135 (statement of Donald L. Neebes, Chairman, Auditing Standards Board of the AICPA).
132. Auditor Responsibility Hearing,supra note 8, at 5 (statement of Rep. Wyden).
133. During these hearings, the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance heard
testimony from the Comptroller General of the United States, the General Counsel of the SEC, and
the Chairman of the Auditing Standards Board of the AICPA. See id. at 13-36, 72-95, 96-117.
134. See id.
135. See id. at 22-36 (statement of Hon. Charles A. Bowsher, Comptroller General of the United
States). The GAO has recently issued a report advocating the accounting profession's required
evaluation of the effectiveness of management's internal controls in detecting fraud and narrowing
the expectation gap regarding the public's perception of the auditor's responsibilities in this area. See
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION, MAJOR ISSUES: PROGRESS AND
CONCERNS (1996) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. For a summary of the GAO's findings and
recommendations, see Douglas R. Carmichael, Report Cardon the Accounting Profession, CPA J.,
Jan. 1997, at 18, 22-23 (noting that to support its recommendation, the GAO "points to the S&L
crisis in the 1980s, as demonstrable proof of the cost to the public of weak internal controls").
136. See Carmichael, supranote 135, at 24; see also Auditor ResponsibilityHearing,supranote
8, at 22-36.
137. See Auditor ResponsibilityHearing,supranote 8, at 32. The GAO suggested language that
would require "[e]very issuer to ... have an independent audit committee made up of totally
independent outside directors (in both fact and appearance), including at least one attorney." Id.
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The SEC took a more practical view, focusing primarily on the
additional costs that would result from requiring additional audit
procedures.'
Specifically, the SEC maintained that the benefits
associated with investor protection must be measured against the burden
such costs would likely have on the capital formation process.'39
Recognizing that changes were made in the 8-K reporting process, 4 '
the SEC cautioned that any additional reporting requirements might
inhibit an issuer's ability to raise capital. 4' The SEC also indicated that
the overly broad definition of "illegality" would require the auditor to
determine whether a violation of a law or regulation could potentially
"relate to" or have a material impact on the company's financial
transactions or assets. Given the complexity and size of most companies, this standard would, in effect, require the auditor to make legal
conclusions concerning a multitude of laws and regulations well beyond
his expertise. 43
Although the accounting profession supported additional audit
requirements with respect to separately reporting on management's
internal controls,'" it cautioned against expanding the auditor's role to
detect and report illegal acts.'45 Given that the recommendations of the
Treadway Commission were beginning to be implemented alongside the
AICPA's new auditing standards,' 46 the accounting profession favored

(emphasis added).
138. See id. at 72-75 (statement of James R. Doty, General Counsel, SEC).
139. See id.
140. This included shortening the period for the registrant's filing of the 8-K report to five
business days and requiring greater disclosure in cases where there is a change in the accountants.
See id. at 85-86. In specific cases, detailed disclosure would be required when the former accountant
recommended that the audit scope be extended or actions by management could indicate opinionshopping among auditors. See id.at 86.
141. See id.
142. See id. at 91.
143. See id.at 91-92 (advocating the idea that the auditor's responsibilities should be limited
to specified laws and regulations where violations have a "direct link with the audit").
144. Such a requirement was not recommended by the Treadway Commission when it
independently reviewed the role of the accountant in the audit process. See supra note 115. A
separate report on the adequacy of management's internal controls is arguably more detailed than
a typical financial statement audit and would significantly increase audit fees. But see PUBLIC
OvmsiGrHT BD., A SPECIAL REPORT BY THE PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD: IssUEs CONFRONTING THE
ACCOUNTING PROFESSION (SEC Practice Section of the Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants
1993) [hereinafter POB REPORT] (recommending that the auditor express an opinion on
management's assertions regarding the adequacy of the company's internal control structure).
145. See AuditorResponsibilityHearing,supranote 8, at 96-97 (statement of Donald L. Neebes,
Chairman, Auditing Standards Board of the AICPA).
146. See supra note 115.
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a "wait and see" approach before similar requirements were statutorily
defined by Congress. 47 In light of the increased costs and lack of
expertise in the many laws and regulations to which a typical company
is subject, the profession also disfavored4 broadening the auditor's
responsibilities with respect to illegal actsY'
C. 102d and 103d Congress
In 1992, the House proposed legislation which did not require the

auditor to issue a separate report on management's internal controls, and
instead, made the auditor's responsibilities with respect to detecting
49
illegal acts more consistent with the existing auditing standards.
However, the bill enhanced the auditor's duty to report illegal acts to the
SEC when the company fails to do so or when the auditor resigns. 5 '
A report issued by the House Committee on Energy and Commerce in
support of H.R. 4313 cited a history of inadequacies in the auditor's
detection and reporting of financial fraud,' as well as a need to
"restore the confidence of the investing public in the integrity of financial
disclosures."' 52
This theme continued into 1993 with legislation introduced by the
House' 53 and Senate,'54 and hearings which again focused on expanding the auditor's duty to detect and report management fraud in a more
147. See Auditor Responsibility Hearing,supra note 8, at 100-02.
148. See id, at 107-12.
149. See H.R. 4313, 102d Cong. § 1 (1992) (cited as the "Financial Fraud Detection and
Disclosure Act"). At the same time, the Senate introduced S. 3181 to "establish a filing deadline and
to provide certain safeguards to curb frivolous ... cases." Securities Private Enforcement Act of
1992, S. 3181, 102d Cong. Preamble. The Senate bill, however, did not focus on auditor responsibilities. See id
150. See H.R. 4313, 102d Cong. § 13A(b)(2)(B), (C) (1992).
151. See H.R. REP. No. 102-890, at 7-15 (1992).
152. Id. at 15 ("By establishing procedures for directly reporting illegal activities ... to the
[SEC], H.R. 4313 will better enable auditors to carry out their responsibilities to ensure the integrity
and accuracy of financial disclosures."). The report, however, declined to specifically state that this
is primarily the responsibility of management and forces the auditor into the difficult and almost
impossible role of ensuring the accuracy of financial statements. See id. at 7-15. The bill also drew
support from the SEC. See id. at 26-28 (letter from Richard C. Breeden, Chairman, SEC).
153. See H.R. 574, 103d Cong. Preamble (1993) (cited as the "Financial Fraud Detection and
Disclosure Act"); H.RL 417, 103d Cong. Preamble (1993) (cited as the "Securities Private
Enforcement Reform Act"). Interestingly, Congress proposed this legislation as an amendment to
section 10 (anti-fraud provisions), rather than section 13 (periodic reporting requirement provisions)
of the Securities Exchange Act. This would arguably make any violations by the auditor more
serious and subject to greater scrutiny in enforcement actions.
154. See S. 630, 103d Cong. Preamble (1993) (cited as the "Financial Fraud Detection and
Disclosure Act").
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timely basis.'55 The House heard the testimony of Richard C. Breeden,
Chairman of the SEC, relating to the provisions of H.R. 574 and audit
reports issued in connection with S&Ls and other businesses that failed
during the 1980s. 56 Chairman Breeden supported this legislation,'57
indicating that while H.R. 574 did not represent a "dramatic change in
existing law,"'5 the enhanced reporting requirements were "a step in
the right direction." 5 9 For the accounting profession, however, this
legislation signaled the beginning of greater SEC involvement in the
establishment of auditing standards. 6
The Senate hearings, focusing on the larger issue of a growing
increase in class action securities litigation, began in the same year and
solicited testimony from both the public and private sector.' 61 In
discussions surrounding audit requirements, the Senate emphasized the
need to establish timely and direct disclosure of management fraud that
is discovered by the auditor. 62 The accounting profession 63 and other
members of the financial and academic communities supported the audit
requirements provisions of both H.R. 574 and its companion bill S.630,

155. See generally FinancialFraud Detection Hearing, supra note 20; Private Litigation
Hearings,supra note 83.
156. See FinancialFraudDetection Hearing,supra note 20, at 18-87.
157. See id.at 48 ("[P]roposed Section 10A could aid enforcement efforts by giving the [SEC]
earlier warning of possible frauds, thus permitting earlier commencement of enforcement actions.").
158. Id. at 50.
159. Id.
160. See id. at 43 ("The [SEC] ...would be prepared, should it prove necessary to fulfill its
statutory mandate, to establish separate auditing standards .... 2).
161. See Private Litigation Hearings, supra note 83; see also Securities Litigation Reform
Hearings,supra note 55.
162. See PrivateLitigation Hearings, supra note 83, at 89-91 (statement of Sen. Kerry). In
effect, Congress sought to reestablish the "public watchdog" role of the auditor whose primary
allegiance is directed to the public, rather than the client. See id. at 293 (statement of Rep. Wyden).
As expected, this view drew strong support from plaintiff attorneys in securities actions. See Melvyn
I. Weiss, Why Auditors Have Failedto Fulfill Their Necessary ProfessionalResponsibilities-And
What to Do About It at the 1992 Abraham J.Briloff Lecture Series on Accounting and Society,
SUNY-Binghamton School of Management (contending that accounting firms have to accept the
responsibility to affirmatively search for and report management fraud).
163. See Private Litigation Hearings, supra note 83, at 299-302 (statement of Jake L.
Netterville, Chairman of the Board, AICPA). In addition, the AICPA supported the recommendations
provided by the report of the Public Oversight Board, see supra note 144, and continued efforts for
the profession to police itself through a program of peer review, quality control checks, and studying
previous cases of management fraud in order to identify possible instances of fraudulent financial
reporting. See Board of Dirs. of the Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants, Meeting the Financial
Reporting Needs of the Future: A Public Commitment from the Public Accounting Profession, J.
AccT., Aug. 1993, at 17; see also SecuritiesLitigation Reform Hearings,supranote 55, at 190-209
(statement of J.Michael Cook, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Deloitte & Touche).
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recognizing a genuine need for the profession to "step-up" its efforts in
this area and regain the public's confidence in the financial reporting
process.'" Neither the House nor Senate bill, however, were acted upon
by the committees, and therefore, the legislation expired at the end of the
103d Congress.
Concurrent with Congress's efforts, the Public Oversight Board
("POB") of the AICPA 65 issued a special report addressing current
issues confronting the accounting profession.' Having first rejected
new mechanisms to regulate the accounting profession, 6 7 the POB
concentrated on ways to improve the existing self-regulatory structure in
order to reduce the growing number of audit failures that plagued the
1980s. 6 Following the POB's report, the Senate, in its first concentrated effort of reform in this area, proposed legislation that would have
modified certain litigation practices in private securities class actions.'69
With respect to the accounting profession, S. 1976 required the SEC to

establish a public auditing self-disciplinary board ("Self-Disciplinary
164. Many of these commentators noted that an expectation gap existed between the accounting
profession and the public with respect to the auditor's role to detect and report management fraud.
See Private LitigationHearings, supra note 83, at 314-16 (statement of Robert A. Bowman, Chief
Financial Officer, ITT Corporation, on behalf of Financial Executives Iristitute); id. at 365-84
(statement of Abraham J. Briloff, Emanuel Saxe Distinguished Professor Emeritus, Bernard M.
Baruch College, The City University of New York); id. at 351-55 (testimony of A.A. Sommer, Jr.,
Chairman, Public Oversight Board of the SEC Practice Section of the AICPA); see also id. at 614-20
(testimony of the AICPA on recent progress in financial accounting and reporting).
165. The POB is a division of the SEC Practice Section of the AICPA that is responsible for
overseeing the peer review process whereby auditors perform a detailed review or "quality control
checek" on the work completed by other auditors. The POB was chaired by A.A. Sommer, Jr., former
Commissioner of the SEC, and included other members of distinguished professional careers in the
public and private sector. See POB REPORT, supra note 144, Preface.
166. The report focused on (i) the existing litigation crisis, (ii) the effectiveness of the AICPA's
self-regulatory programs and proposed recommendations, (iii) improvements to existing auditing
standards relating to financial statement audits, and (iv) recommendations addressing the auditor's
role in detecting management fraud and enhancing the financial reporting process. See id.; see also
PrivateLitigation Hearings,supra note 83, at 302-04.
167. The recommendation that accounting firms create self-regulatory bodies to improve the
quality of the audit was first recognized by congressional hearings that resulted in the Metcalf
Report. See supra note 109.
168. See POB REPORT, supra note 144, at 27-30. The POB recommended that all accounting
firms performing financial audits of public companies be a member of the SEC Practice Section of
the AICPA and be subject to annual peer reviews and quality control guidelines. See id. at 17-18,
27-30. The POB also recommended that accounting firms (alternatively, "member firms") modify
their internal quality control systems so that a uniform set of accounting and auditing procedures
addressing new or special problems is established in light of the increase in litigation currently
experienced by the profession. See id.
169. See S. 1976, 103d Cong. (1994) (introduced by Sen. Christopher Dodd (D-Conn.) and Sen.
Pete Domenici (R-NM)).
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Section 204 of S. 1976 would require all accounting firms

whose reports are filed with the SEC to register with the Self-Disciplinary Board 7 ' and be subject to investigations and disciplinary proceed-

ings for violations of federal securities laws or professional standards in
connection with their audit reports. 72 Although this provision was

ultimately eliminated from the enacted law, it was significant in that it
represented Congress's concerted effort to require the SEC to create a
statutory self-disciplinary organization to regulate the public accounting
profession in place of the profession's existing self-policing policies.'
The POB also made recommendations aimed at improving the
quality of the audit by enhancing the accounting profession's "capacity
and willingness to detect fraud" in light of the serious economic losses
experienced by investors and creditors. 74 First, the POB advised that
a uniform set of guidelines should be established in order to assist the
profession in identifying management fraud'75 and reemphasized the
need for the auditor to maintain the highest level of independence. 76
Second, the POB supported the profession's view that it report separately

170. See id. § 204 (included in Title II of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1994).
Prior to S. 1976, the House and Senate introduced legislation addressing the auditor's responsibility
to detect and report fraud only. See H.R. 574, 103d Cong. (1993); S. 630, 103d Cong. (1993).
S. 1976, therefore, represented broader legislation that incorporated the provisions of H.R. 574 and
S. 630 and represented the first time that outside regulation of the accounting profession was
statutorily defined. Surprisingly, this provision was supported by the accounting profession. See
Securities Litigation Reform Hearings, supra note 55, at 199 (statement of J. Michael Cook,
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Deloitte & Touche).
171. This would be accomplished by the filing of an application that detailed (1) the names of
all clients of the accounting firm for which an audit report is filed, (2) financial information for the
accounting firm's most recent fiscal year, and (3) a statement of the accounting finm's policies and
procedures with respect to quality control of its accounting and auditing practice. See S. 1976 sec.
204, § 13A(e)(2)(A)-(C).
172. See id. § 13A(f)(1). The Self-Disciplinary Board, partially run by individuals currently
associated with a public accounting firm, would have the authority to review a member firm's work
papers and require testimony of any of the involved parties. See id. § 13A(f)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). Based on
its findings, the Self-Disciplinary Board could revoke the member firm's registration and effectively
prevent them from auditing public companies, limit the accounting firm's professional activities,
order a fine or censure, or suspend the accounting firm for a period oftime. See id. § 13A(t)(3)(A),
(B).
173. For a detailed listing of the accounting profession's self-regulatory programs, see POB
REPORT, supra note 144, at 71-80.

174. Id. at 41.
175. See id.at 43 (Recommendations V-1 and V-2).
176. See id. at 44-45 (Recommendations V-3 and V-4). The POB also "reminded" the
accountant "that the [accounting] firm's reputation for independence isfar more valuable than the
fees obtained from any client." Id. at 44 (emphasis added).
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on the client's internal control structure relating to financial reporting.' More importantly, the POB, in agreement with Congress,
recommended that the auditor report "suspected illegalities"'" to the
SEC if the client fails to take remedial action, but indicated that guidance
would be necessary in order to limit the scope of illegal acts for which
the profession would be responsible.'7 9 Additionally, in an effort to
narrow the expectation gap, the POB attempted to clarify the roles of the
accountant8 0 and the audit committee' in the financial reporting
process.
D. 104th Congress
The 1994 election brought a Republican majority to Congress and
accelerated legislation in the area of securities litigation reform.8 2
These efforts, however, mainly represented Congress's aggressive support
for an overhaul of the existing securities litigation process and did not
specifically focus on the auditor's responsibility to detect and report
fraud. ' 3 Indeed, this shift in attention away from the accounting
profession ultimately led to the House Commerce Committee omitting
the fraud detection and disclosure section from H.R. 10.1' The Senate,
however, included such provisions in conpanion legislation that it
proposed in both the prior and current term.'85 In the end, because
177. See id. at 54 (Recommendation V-12). For a general discussion on the mixed reaction this
recommendation has historically received, see supra notes 114 and 144.
178. Id. at 55 (Recommendation V-14) (emphasis added). The POB report does not, however,
clarify or define the scope of this term.

179. See id.
180. See id. at 39-40 (Recommendation IV-4) (recommending that the auditor's standard report
be modified in order to indicate the "limitation of assurance" associated with certain accounting
estimates).

181. See idat 51-52 (Recommendation V-10) (recommending that companies include a separate
document indicating the responsibilities of the audit committee and the manner in which they are
carried out).
182. See Phillips & Miller, supra note 3, at 1019 n.63.

183. See Common Sense Legal Reform Act: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Telecomms. and
Fin. of the House Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong. (1995). These hearings did, however, focus
on the issue of proportionate liability with respect to the accountant. See id.

184. See H.R. 10, 104th Cong. § 1 (1995) (cited as the "Common Sense Legal Reforms Act of
1995"). H.R. 10 addressed both product liability reform and securities litigation reform. See id.
(Titles I and II, respectively); see also H.R. REP. No. 104-50 (1995).
§ 301 (1995).
185. See S.1976, 103d Cong. tit. II, § 202 (1994); S.240, 104th Cong. tit. III,
In hearings on S. 240, the Senate reaffirmed the SEC's authority "to determine the appropriateness
and timeliness" of the accounting profession's response to its professional and statutory duty to
detect and report fraud and "act promptly if required by the public interest or for the protection of

investors." S. REP. No. 104-98, at 24 (1995); see also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 48 (1995).
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previous legislation that codified these audit requirements had gained
strong support in Congress as a deterrent to securities fraud,'8 6 they
were included as part of comprehensive legislation on securities litigation
reform which was ultimately enacted.'
A Conference Report on
H.R. 1058,88 the enacted bill, was submitted to both the House and
Senate and overwhelmingly passed.'89
VI.

A.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF SECTION 10A ON THE
AUDIT ENGAGEMENT AND THE USERS OF
AUDITED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

An Increase in Up-FrontAudit Planning and Higher Audit Fees

The initial effect of section 10A of the Reform Act on the auditor
will be the need to perform more up-front planning of audit procedures.
This will entail a comprehensive review of existing audit programs,
clearer documentation with respect to procedures the audit team must
perform, and specific procedures for situations where a possible illegal
act warrants further investigation. The engagement team must be aware
of the laws and regulations affecting their client's industry and plan the
audit to detect material and direct illegal acts. For example, if the client
is a broker-dealer, the auditor would certainly need to assess the
company's compliance with the IRS, the Securities and Exchange Acts
of 1933 and 1934, and rules and regulations promulgated by the SEC,
New York Stock Exchange, National Association of Securities Dealers,
and other regulatory agencies. However, it is unclear whether the
auditor's responsibilities will change with respect to other areas where
illegal acts may occur, such as violations of environmental and fair labor
laws.'90 Additionally, the wide array of legal requirements affecting
companies that are engaged in foreign operations could affect the

186. See 141 CONG.'REc. H14049 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1995) ("[I]n the future, management will
know that they cannot have an auditor in their pocket. They will know that an auditor has a legal
responsibility to report fraud when this legislation is signed." (statement of Rep. WVyden)).
187. See H.R. 1058, 104th Cong. § 1 (1995) (cited as the "Securities Litigation Reform Act");
see also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369 (report accompanying H.R. 1058).
188. See H.R. CoNF. REP. NO. 104-369.
189. See 141 CONG. REc. S17997 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (Senate vote of 65-30); 141 CONG.
REC. H14055 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1995) (House vote of 320-102). After President Clinton vetoed the
legislation, the Senate narrowly overrode the veto. See supra note 1.
190. See Auditor Responsibility Hearing,supra note 8, at 92 (statement of James R. Doty,
General Counsel, SEC).
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auditor's responsibilities. 91 The auditor, therefore, will likely face a
difficult situation when possible illegal acts outside the familiar "domain
of financial oversight" are discovered.192
In addressing some of these uncertainties, the auditor may initially
need to meet with his own in-house legal counsel to be assured that he
has adequately assessed the client's legal environment. In addition,
discussions with the client's counsel will also be necessary in order to
review the company's procedures for complying with these laws and
regulations, as well as identifying other areas in which an illegal act
would likely have a material effect on the company's financial state-

ments. As a matter of self-protection, the auditor should seek additional
representations from management clearly defining the auditor's responsibility to prevent and report such acts as well as assurances that all
relevant information regarding any possible illegal acts has been provided
to the auditor in an accurate and timely manner. 3 The auditor may
seek additional protection by increasing the audit fees to reflect the
anticipated liability that would accrue if the auditor is later judged to
have violated the provisions of section 10A. 94
Audit areas such as related parties and a going concern evalua-

tion'95 have traditionally received less scrutiny than that given to illegal
acts." 6 For example, under the existing professional literature, the

191. See id. at 109 (statement of Donald L. Neebes, Chairman, Auditing Standards Board of the
AICPA).
192. Charles M. Carberry & Harold K. Gordon, Outside Auditors as Gov't Informers Under
New Securities Reform Law, 3 BuS. CRMES BULL.: COMPLiANCE AND LMG. 4, 5 (1996).
193. Under GAAS, the auditor is required to obtain written representations from the company's
management regarding oral representations made during the audit or to complement audit procedures
performed. See Statement on Auditing Standards, supra note 9, No. 19, §§ 333.01-.03. While the
elements of a management representation letter will vary by engagement, all such letters will include
a representation that the company's management has disclosed "[v]iolations or possible violations
of laws or regulations whose effects should be considered for disclosure in the financial statements
or as a basis for recording a loss contingency." Id. § 333.04(q).
194. See DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J.).
195. In many cases, the task of completing audit "checklists" addressing these areas were last
minute and general in nature. A going concern evaluation was rarely formally documented and if
significant, would be raised as an audit issue early on in the engagement. See Steven G. Blum &
Reva B. Steinberg, Earnings Per Share: Confronting Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit,
INSIGHTS, Aug. 1996, at 34, 36 (noting that in cases where audit procedures addressing management
fraud are "merely relegated to auditor checklists obligingly checked off, no incremental good will
come from them!).
196. Under the existing auditing standards, the auditor is required to inquire of the company's
lawyer(s) concerning litigation, claims, and assessments pending or threatened against the company.
See Statement on Auditing Standards, supra note 9, No. 12, § 337. This will enable the auditor to
identify those illegal acts allegedly committed by the company in which a material or probable loss
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auditor is not required to design procedures directed specifically at a
going concern evaluation.'97 Under the Reform Act, however, such a
requirement now exists; 98 the auditor must formally document the
procedures and analyses undertaken to support the determination that the
company is indeed a going concern. This will range from discussions
with management and review of board meeting minutes to increased
analytical procedures and a review of any financial projections and
forecasts prepared by the company.
These factors will result in additional audit hours and fees that the
auditor will attempt to recover from the client. This increase in audit fees
will likely be met with a strong level of resistance by client management.
Indeed, the private sector has already indicated an unwillingness to pay
fees related to additional audit procedures that "will result in substantial
increased costs without providing sufficient incremental benefit.""' In
many cases, the audit fee is the basis of considerable negotiation as the
client will attempt to keep these fees as low as possible while the
accounting firm will attempt to avoid discounting its fees."' If the
client refuses such fee increases, the auditor may feel pressured to reduce
or eliminate certain audit procedures, thereby jeopardizing the overall
quality of the audit.2 '

is likely to occur. See id If the lawyer refuses to respond to this inquiry, a scope limitation may
occur that would preclud6 the auditor from issuing an unqualified or standard audit opinion. See id.
§ 337.13.

197. See supranote 97; see also Auditor ResponsibilityHearing,supranote 8, at 16 (statement
of Hon. Charles A. Bowsher, Comptroller General of the United States).
198. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(a)(3) (Supp. I 1995).
199. Auditor Responsibility Hearing,supra note 8, at 121 (statement of John WV. Spiegel,
Chairman of the American Bankers Association's Chief Financial Officer Division).
200. Recognizing this tension, the POB noted that "[a]udit firms have [an] obligation to refuse
to perform audit services for fees that may compromise the integrity of the audit." POB REPORT,
supra note 144, at 52.
201. See id.
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B. A Need to Modify Engagement Letters to ClearlyDefine the
Auditors and Management's Roles
The audit detection and reporting requirements under section 1OA
may prompt the auditor to include specific language in the client engagement letter as a protection against liability.2 2 This would likely include
specific language indicating that management be responsible for
providing additional information and the necessary resources in the event
that the auditor discovers an illegal act and must therefore perform
additional procedures. In order to avoid future disagreement, the auditor
should draft the engagement letter with broad language, indicating that
"[m]anagement and the audit committee [will] provide whatever
assistance and information [that] may be appropriate to enable the
auditors to fulfill their statutory obligations."2 3
While the plain language of section 10A refers to illegal acts discovered "in the course of conducting an audit,"2 the auditor should seek
to clarify the method for handling acts discovered outside the annual
audit.0" If the SEC resolves this ambiguity by placing a similar
requirement on all services performed by the auditor, the accounting
profession will need assurance that the auditor liability limitation
provided for in section 10A is also applicable to these additional services.2 6 It is likely that the requirements of section 10A will be held
applicable to reviews of interim financial statements, given the auditor's
reliance7 on these procedures when planning and performing the annual
20
audit.
Lastly, the auditor should carefully draft the engagement letter so

that management is responsible for any additional costs incurred in the

202. Although not required by the auditing standards, the use of an engagement letter is a
widely accepted practice in specifying the responsibilities of both client management and the auditor

with respect to the audit procedures and a proposed fee, subject to increase if additional work is
necessary. See O'REILLY ET AL., supra note 23, at 96.
203. Pitt et al., supra note 37, at 279 (emphasis omitted). This could include an examination
of previous regulatory filings, customer complaint files, and management reports; discussions with
counsel and senior management; and additional audit procedures deemed necessary by the auditor.

See id.
204. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(b)(1) (Supp. 11995).
205. See Pitt et al., supra note 37, at 280 (noting that the accountant may also perform quarterly
reviews of interim financial statements and other non-attest services concerning the company's
operations or other reported financial information).

206. See id.
207. See id. at 456 n.22.
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event that a possible illegal act is discovered. While this will inevitably
lead to some disagreement over what constitutes a "possible illegal act,"
without such qualifying language the auditor will have little, if any,
chance of collecting any additional fees.
C. A Need to Develop a Uniform Standard of Evidence and
Investigative Proceduresin Detecting filegal Acts
Section 10A requires the accountant, in the course of conducting an
audit, to "determine whether it is likely that an illegal act has occurred."" °' It does not, however, provide the auditor with a standard of
evidence to be used in determining whether an illegal act has occurred.
Given Congress's clear displeasure with the accounting profession's past
efforts in detecting and reporting management fraud and illegal acts, it
is unclear why it would leave such a standard of evidence undefined and
use language that so closely tracks the profession's existing literature." 9
In effect, section 10A forces the auditor to make legal judgments
regarding the existence of certain facts and the likelihood that an illegal
act has occurred."0 Once the auditor makes such a determination, these
matters must be promptly communicated to the company's audit
committee or board of directors.
There is also a lack of guidance on the nature and scope of the
investigation that the auditor is expected to undertake once an illegal act
is discovered. For example, the auditor may decide to involve both the
client's or accounting firm's in-house or outside counsel, conduct his
own investigation," or, depending upon the complexity or significance

208. 15 U.S.C. 78j-l(b)(1)(A)(i) (emphasis added).
209. It is possible that Congress did not want the auditor to engage in making such a legal
determination, and by omitting a legal standard, the auditor would be inclined to report a greater
number of items to management or the SEC.

The auditing standards do not offer any further guidance on the standard of evidence the
auditor should apply. See Statement on Auditing Standards, supra note 9, No. 54, §§ 317.10-.12.
"When the auditor concludes, based on information obtained and, if necessary, consultation with
legal counsel, that an illegal act has or is likely to have occurred,the auditor should consider the
effect on the financial statements as well as the implications for other aspects of the audit." Id.
§ 317.12 (emphasis added).
210. See Andrew J. Pincus, Auditor Responsibilities:Auditor Detection of CorporateFraud,
INSIGHTS, Feb. 1996, at 25.
211. In such cases, the auditor could use the audit engagement team to perform any additional

procedures or the accounting firm's litigation support group which is specifically trained for such
situations. See Elizabeth MacDonald, Accounting Sleuths FerretHidden Assets, WALL ST. J., Dec.

18, 1996, at BI (noting that an increasing number of forensic accountants are being used in
investigating white-collar crimes and fraud).
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of the item, contract with a third party to conduct a separate investigation. If the client conducts its own investigation with counsel, issues of
attorney-client and work-product privileges arise.2" 2 This will create
tension because providing the auditor access to this information may
jeopardize those privileges, but may also be the "best way to convince
the auditors that no illegal act has occurred or that the remedial actions
taken were 'timely and appropriate."'2 3 Management will most likely
choose not to waive these privileges, and as a result, the auditor may
have 4difficulties satisfying his statutory obligations under the Reform
21
Act.
D. A Need for Greater Communication Between the
Auditor and Client Management
Section 10A will require a greater level of communication between
client management and the auditor both before and during the audit.
Given the immediacy of the reporting requirements, management should
"review, enhance and regularize its lines of communication with
company auditors"2 5 in order to avoid being subject to the strict
notification requirements under the Reform Act.21 6 More importantly,
such on-time discussions will provide management with the opportunity
to take remedial action for illegal acts detected by the auditor before a
section 10A Report is filed with the SEC. Management will seek to avoid
this notification because it may subject the company to adverse publicity
and attention from various governmental agencies.2" 7
Current auditing standards provide for some level of communication
between the auditor and client management both during and at the
conclusion of the audit.2"' Under the Reform Act, however, manage-

212. See Carberry & Gordon, supra note 192, at 5; Pitt et al., supra note 37, at 280.
213. Carberry & Gordon, supra note 192, at 5.
214. Because the auditor's work papers are not privileged, management's decision will be
influenced by the likelihood that information released will be used against the company in future

litigation or enforcement actions. See id.
215. Pitt et al., supra note 37, at 273 (emphasis omitted).
216. This refers to the report filed by either the company or the auditor under section 1OA(b)(3)
of the Reform Act.
217. See Pitt et al., supra note 37, at 274.
218. See Statement on Auditing Standards, supra note 9, No. 53, § 316.28 ("For the audit
committee to make the informed judgments necessary to fulfill its responsibility for the oversight
of financial reporting, the auditor should assure himself that the audit committee is adequately

informed about any irregularities of which the auditor becomes aware . ..

.'); No.

54, § 317.17

("The auditor should assure himself that the audit committee, or others with equivalent authority and
responsibility, is adequately informed with respect to illegal acts that come to the auditor's

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1997

39

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 4 [1997], Art. 5
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:1261

ment must adopt a proactive approach in their dealings with the auditors
by formally designating certain senior level officers to communicate with
the auditors on a more regular basis. In addition, both the auditor and

client management should strongly consider maintaining a formal record
detailing the timing and context of their discussions and the disposition
of any possible illegality or fraudulent financial reporting. If such issues
become the subject of future litigation, this record will protect the auditor
by indicating that the matter was either appropriately identified and
resolved or not discovered even though the auditor complied with the
requirements of both GAAS and section 10A.

E. A Need to Assess the Adequacy of the Company's
Remedial Actions for Materialillegal Acts
Under section 1A 21 9 and current auditing standards,"0 the auditor must structure the audit to detect illegal acts, determine whether such
an act occurred, and assess the potential financial impact of such acts.

attention.'); No. 60, § 325.18 ("Because timely communication [of internal control related matters]
may be important, the auditor may choose to communicate significant matters during the course of
the audit rather than after the audit is concluded."); No. 61, § 380.01 (noting that the auditor is
required "to determine that certain matters related to the conduct of an audit are communicated to
those who have responsibility for oversight of the financial reporting process"); see also Pitt et al.,
supra note 37, at 273-74.
219. See 15 U.S.C. 78j-l(a)(1) (Supp. 11995).
220. See Statement on Auditing Standards, supra note 9, No. 54, § 317. Accountants have long
held that such a requirement is outside the scope of their expertise. Traditionally, the professional
literature has disclaimed the ability of the accountants to make such legal determinations. See Id.
§ 317.03 ("Whether an act is, in fact, illegal is a determination that is normally beyond the auditor's
professional competence.... [ his determination] would generally be based on the advice of an
informed expert qualified to practice law ...-.

).

The literature further provides that an audit

conducted in accordance with GAAS "provides no assurance that illegal acts will be detected or that
any contingent liabilities that may result will be disclosed." Id. § 317.07; see also Elizabeth
MacDonald, AuditorsAre Ending Up Between a Rock and a HardPlaceover SecuritiesLaw, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 24, 1996, at Cl.
This view has also garnered some support from the SEC. See Auditor ResponsibilityHearing,
supra note 8, at 91.
[T]he auditor will have to acquire or develop the expertise necessary to understand the
requirements of all federal, state, and foreign statutes and regulations applicable to the
registrant.... Designing an audit to meet this standard would require auditors to
determine the elements of every law violation that arguably ...has a "material impact
on" financial transactions, a determination that may be beyond their professional
expertise.
Id. (statement of James R. Doty, General Counsel, SEC, relating to a July 30, 1990 Discussion
Draft). Members of the banking industry have also sided with the accountants on this issue. See id.
at 117 (testimony of John W. Spiegel, Chairman of the American Bankers Association's Chief
Financial Officer Division).
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Moreover, section 10A requires an auditor to determine whether a
company has taken "timely and appropriate remedial actions" when a
material illegal act has been detected." This places both a managerial
and legal responsibility on the auditor to assess the adequacy of a
company's response and perhaps play a role in developing and implementing such remedial measures. However, neither the Reform Act nor
the legislative history offers the auditor guidance in assessing whether the
remedial actions taken by the company are adequate.'m
The task of evaluating such nonfinancial matters traditionally falls
outside the scope of the auditor's professional expertise. This further
places the auditor in a difficult position as management's remedial
actions could range from an internal reprimand and a change in the
company's policies to firing any parties involved and obtaining expert
legal advice.'m Moreover, if there is a future dispute between the SEC
and client management over the seriousness of the wrongdoing and the
remedial actions taken, the auditor may be subject to future litigation
concerning his role in agreeing with such actions and not reporting the
illegal act. This is also likely to challenge the long-standing requirement
that the auditor remain independent from the client at all times given the
auditor's role in determining the adequacy of actions undertaken by the
company's management. 4

221. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(b)(2)(B).
222. See Carberry & Gordon, supra note 192, at 5; see also Pitt et al., supra note 37, at 277
n.18 ('While current auditing standards imply that auditors should consider whether management
has taken appropriate remedial measures upon learning that illegal acts may have occurred, they
provide limited guidance as to what types of measures are appropriate in different circumstances.').
In addition, section 10A offers no guidance on whether such remedial actions must address future
illegal acts. See Eldon Olson, FraudDetection and Disclosure-PrivateSecurities LitigationReform
Act of 1995, in SWEEPING REFORM: LITIGATING AND BESPEAKING CAUTION UNDER THE NEW
SEcuRITIEs LAX';, at 497, 507 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-923,
1996).
223. The accounting standards indicate that remedial actions typically include "disciplinary
action against involved personnel, seeking restitution, adoption of preventive or corrective company
policies, and modifications of specific control procedures." Statement on Auditing Standards, supra
note 9, No. 54, § 317.17.
If the auditor and client management disagree over the adequacy of the remedial actions
taken in light of the illegal acts discovered, the company will likely face a section 10A report that
will be filed with the SEC. See Carberry & Gordon, supra note 192, at 5. Therefore, agreement
between these parties is essential in order to avoid the repercussions associated with SEC notification.
224. See Pitt et al.,
supra note 37, at 282. The importance of the auditor's independence is
underscored by its placement as the second general standard of GAAS. See Statement on Auditing
Standards, supra note 9, No. I, § 150.02 ("In all matters relating to the assignment, an independence
in mental attitude is to be maintained by the auditor or auditors.").
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F An Increase in the Overall Audit Procedures
Applied to Illegal Acts Discovered

Section 10A significantly increases the auditor's responsibilities
once an illegal act is detected. In earlier versions of proposed legislation
concerning illegal acts, Congress intended a far broader definition of
"illegal act" than is presently required under the professional literature.' Although the present definition is arguably more narrow in
scope, there is an absence of any clear guidance on whether the audit is

limited to those illegal acts which have a natural or direct link with the
audit process. Thus, the courts will be left with the responsibility of
establishing standards in this area, and the auditor will be subjected to
the real risk that the courts will adopt a broader definition consistent with
the views expressed by clear congressional intent. 6
Although the audit need only be planned to provide reasonable
assurance of detecting material and direct illegal acts,227 section 10A
requires the auditor to perform additional audit procedures whether or not
the illegal act is perceived to have a material effect on the company's
financial statements." While both the existing auditing standards229

The issue of auditor independence has drawn attention in a recent report prepared by the
GAO in conjunction with Congress's consideration of section 1OA, aimed at evaluating the overall
performance of the accounting profession. See GAO REPORT, supra note 135, at 37-59; see also
Carmichael, supra note 135, at 18-24. While the report noted that auditor independence has
strengthened, serious challenges continue due to the increase in management consulting services,
management "shopping" for favorable audit opinions, and instances where there is "a more direct
working relationship between the auditor and the board of directors." Id. at 20. This concern will be
heightened by the enactment of section 10A given the auditor's increased role in evaluating those
remedial acts taken by management in response to illegal acts detected by the auditor.
225. See supra note 126. In the final passage of the Reform Act, however, this definition was
amended and "illegal act" was defined only as "an act or omission that violates any law, or any rule
or regulation having the force of law." 15 U.S,C. § 78j-l(f).
226. The SEC recogized this issue and has advocated that Congress should consider limiting
the scope of such laws and regulations to cases where compliance problems have a direct link with
the audit process. See Auditor Responsibility Hearing,supra note 8, at 90-92 (statement of James
R. Doty, General Counsel, SEC).
227. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(a)(1).
228. This closely parallels the requirements under the existing professional literature. See
Statement on Auditing Standards, supra note 9, No. 54, §§ 317.10-.16. The real impact of section
10A is likely to result from the Reform Act's express grant of authority to the SEC to modify or
supplement GAAS. Although the SEC has traditionally not taken an active role in formulating
accounting and auditing standards, it is likely that section 10A will heighten the SEC's role in the
future adoption of such standards. See infra Part VI.G.
229. See Statement on Auditing Standards, supra note 9, No. 54, § 317.17.
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and the Reform Act 0 do not require the auditor to report those illegal
acts to the audit committee that are "clearly inconsequential," this term
is left undefined in the Reform Act, and again, the auditor is offered no
guidance from Congress in making such a determination. 3 This will
require the audit committee and the auditors to reach an agreement on
the type of acts which may qualify for this narrow designation. In many
cases, however, it may prove easier for the auditor to perform expanded
or heightened auditing procedures when such acts are discovered in order
to avoid future liability if the courts adopt a narrower definition of this

exclusion.

2

The legislative history will offer the auditor little help if it is
considered by the courts when interpreting the statute3 3 A review of
this history reveals that section 10A was borne out of Congress's

frustration with the auditor's inability to detect and report illegal acts and
fraud in a timely manner in order to prevent investor losses and federal
bailouts. It will also reveal that from the outset, Congress intended the
auditor to assume the broadest possible role in this area, thus reinforcing
the Supreme Court's earlier mandate that the auditor serve as the public's

"watchdog." Given this scenario, it is unlikely that the auditor will be
able to raise many defenses in light of his affirmative duty to detect
fraud under section 10A. In separate efforts by the profession to deal
with this issue, the accounting profession has issued a new auditing
standard that provides operational guidance on the consideration of fraud
in a financial statement audit. 4

230. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(b)(1)(B).
231. Since the same term appears in the current auditing standards, it is logical to assume that
Congress intended the auditor to use the same or similar standards in making such an evaluation.
232. Section 10A does not provide the accounting firm with a safe harbor in cases where the
auditor makes a good faith determination that notification to the SEC is not warranted because an
illegal act has not occurred or that an illegal act discovered during the audit was judged to be
"clearly inconsequential.' See Dan L. Goldwasser, The PrivateSecurities Litigation Reform Act of
1995: Impact on Accountants, CPA J., Jan. 1997, at 72, 74-75.
233. See supra Part V.
234. The new standard is the direct result of the massive financial frauds and scandals which
prompted the enactment of the Reform Act, discussed supra note 11. See Mark Maremont, Bean
Counters Get an Early-WarningSystem, Bus. WK., Dec. 9, 1996, at 68 (noting that "the [proposed]
standard sets far tougher guidelines for auditors assessing the risk of fraud when conducting an
audit"); Lee Berton, Auditors FaceStiffer Rulesfor Finding,ReportingFraudat Client Companies,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 1996, at A2 ('[T]he proposed standards [will] provide auditors with more 'red
flags' for fraud, such as a toothless board of directors or a domineering chief executive who fails
to set an ethical tone, as well as poor internal controls."); see also Elizabeth MacDonald, CPA
Institute Tightens Rules to Find Fraud,WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 1996, at A6; Thomas Ray & Jane
Mancino, Auditing Standards Board Addresses Fraud,J. AccT., June 1996, at 17. For a detailed
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G. An Increased Role by the SEC in the
Promulgationof Auditing Standards
The SEC's express authority to modify or supplement GAAS under
the Reform Act"5 is likely to increase the SEC's presence in an area
that has traditionally been the domain of the accounting profession. 6
In hearings held in connection with the Reform Act, former SEC
Chairman Richard C. Breeden noted that the accounting profession must
promulgate accounting and auditing standards that "enhance the
relevance, reliability, and credibility of financial statements.""n7 Indeed,

discussion of this standard, see infra Part VII.A.
235. See supra note 22.
236. See supra note 23. The SEC has indicated their intention to assume a greater role in the
setting of auditing standards. As Richard C. Breeden, former chairman of the SEC has stated:
Not every accounting principle is what it should be, in my opinion, and there is plenty
of room for improvement in both GAAP and GAAS. Nonetheless, vie have a system that
does have considerable flexibility and it benefits enormously from the expertise of the
[accounting] profession mixed with the representation of the public interest provided by
the SEC.
At the same time, when [GAAS] and implementation of those standards through
auditing procedures lags too far behind generally accepted embezzling practices, the
public will suffer, and it can suffer in an enormous amount. Some members individually
who become victims of these frauds can suffer in a very big way.
FinancialFraudDetection Hearing,supra note 20, at 16. Recently, current SEC Chairman Arthur
Levitt has indicated a similar need for high audit quality and the need for auditor performance to
meet growing public expectations. See Arthur Levitt, The Accountant's Critical Eye, Remarks at
AICPA 24th Annual National Conference on Current SEC Developments (Dec. 10, 1996).
The SEC is concerned about standard setting because of our mandate to protect
investors.... In many respects, the [accounting] profession has performed its role well.
Indeed, the incidence of fraudulent financial reporting in this country has been very low.
But certain rumblings above and below the surface suggest that the profession may be
discounting the huge importance investors place on the objectivity and independence of
auditors.
Id. It does not appear, however, that the SEC currently plans to increase its existing role in the
promulgation of accounting principles (GAAP). See id. While noting that the SEC has the statutory
authority to promulgate accounting standards, it has "looked to the accounting profession to play a
leading role, while the SEC staff monitors and oversees these standard setting activities." Id. In
reference to the increasing attempts to enhance the role of the SEC in this area, (e.g., the Reform
Act), Chairman Levitt has stated, "we're all better off in the long run if we respect [this existing]
process." Id.
237. FinancialFraudDetection Hearing,supra note 20, at 51. Chairman Breeden further noted
that "[s]impler, more objective accounting standards would make it possible for auditors to obtain
more objective and relevant evidence regarding compliance with those accounting standards,
resulting in more reliable audit reports." Id. at n.40 (referring to accounting standards currently used
to measure the carrying value of assets).
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Congress intended to specifically provide for the SEC's authority in this

area." t Given this clear authorization, the SEC may be "unable, or

unwilling, to resist the temptation to issue new audit requirements." z9
The SEC may also be prompted to set new auditing standards in
response to Congress's clear disfavor of the accounting profession's
previous efforts in detecting and reporting management fraud and illegal
acts.24 This may force the SEC to adopt a more visible role in the
development of auditing standards. Consequently, the SEC may decide
to promulgate new audit requirements or take a more reserved role and
issue interpretations of existing audit standards, leaving the accounting
profession with the primary responsibility of defining GAAS. 24 The
GAO has recommended that the SEC take "a more decisive and
affirmative approach to its oversight of the financial regulatory process" 242 as part of a "cooperative action by the [accounting] profession
and [f]ederal regulators to strengthen public accounting practice."243 In
the end, section 10A and the ever-growing sophistication of business
transactions and strategies will likely result in the SEC infringing upon
areas traditionally considered to be the accounting profession's domain. 244

238. See PrivateLitigation Hearings,supranote 83, at 90 ("The Financial Fraud Detection and
Disclosure Act [S. 630] would give the SEC the ability to issue new requirements to auditors to
supplement current auditing standards, to assist them in detecting financial chicanery." (statement
of Sen. Kerry)).
239. Pitt et al., supra note 37, at 281 (footnote omitted).
240. See supra note 12. But see Pitt et al., supra note 37, at 281 (noting that the SEC "has only
rarely disciplined accountants based on their alleged failure under GAAS to detect and report illegal
acts by clients").
241. See Pitt et al., supra note 37, at 281.
242. Carmichael, supra note 135, at 24.
243. Id.
244. The SEC recently adopted Rule 1OA-1 in connection with the implementation of section
10A. See Implementation of Section 10A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 62 Fed. Reg.
12,743 (1997). The reports submitted by the auditor will be nonpublic and therefore will be accorded
confidential treatment. See id. at 12,745. The SEC also conformed the definition of "audie' in
regulation S-X with section 10A in order to "alert auditors and issuers to the possibility that
additional audit procedures, beyond those required by GAAS, may be required by the [SEC] in
certain circumstances." Id. at 12,746-47. In general, however, the SEC plans to continue its practice
of "'looking to the private-sector... in establishing and improving GAAS.' SECAdopts NewAudit
Requirements, J. ACCr., June 1997, at 13, 13. However, the "SEC could require audit procedures
in addition to those required by [GAAS]." Id.
Similarly, increased activity and reported losses in derivative securities trading prompted the
SEC's proposal to enhance existing derivatives accounting disclosure and provide more information
with respect to market risks inherent in these instruments. See Proposed Amendments to Require
Disclosure of Accounting Policies for Derivative Financial Instruments and Derivative Commodity
Instruments, Exchange Act Release No. 36,643, [1995-1996 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep.
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H. A "Chill" on the Auditor-ClientRelationship
The auditor's enhanced reporting requirements under section 10A
will test the existing auditor-client relationship and force the accountant
to assume the role of a "whistle-blower." 45 Given the strict reporting
deadlines imposed upon the auditor under section 10A, management will
be less willing to disclose certain internal investigations until it has
enough time to assess the magnitude of the problem and implement
appropriate remedial actions. In contrast, the auditor will be inclined to
report a greater number of questionable illegal or fraudulent actions in
order to be protected from future liability 46 Once the auditor learns of
a possible illegal act and management fails to act, the auditor is placed
in the difficult position of choosing between "the threat of civil penalties
from the 7 SEC on the one hand and the consequences of a mistaken
report.

24

If the auditor decides that notification to the SEC is warranted, he
is faced with the unenviable choice of resigning from the account or risk
being fired. If, however, the auditor has not already resigned or been
fired, but is subsequently proved wrong, section 10A can do little to
salvage a working relationship between the auditor and the client or,
more importantly, remedy the damage caused to the company's
reputation and heightened scrutiny from the regulators.
The auditor may decide that notification is not warranted if the
illegal act is deemed to be immaterialJ2 48 or senior management has
taken "timely and appropriate remedial actions."' 9 If it is determined

(CCH) 85,716 (Dec. 28, 1995); see also Steven M.H. Wallman, The Future of Accounting and
FinancialReporting PartII: The ColorizedApproach, ACCT. HORIzONS, June 1996, at 141 ("It is
becoming harder to define the outer edges of companies. The information revolution is moving us
to a new plateau where businesses can operate with greater agility than ever before.").

245. Congress specifically envisioned that the auditor would assume such a role. See 141 CONG.
REC. H 14049 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1995) ("[L]et us do more to prevent fraud up front by requiring the
auditors to blow the whistle." (statement of Rep. Wyden)); Carberry & Gordon, supra note 192, at
4 ("[Section] 1OA imposes a statutory obligation on public accounting firms, in certain circumstances, to 'blow the whistle' on their clients by reporting suspected unlawful conduct to the [SEC].");
see also Brodsky, supra note 7, at 3; Robert Sidorsky, Auditor's Duty to Blow the Whistle Under
the Litigation Reform Act, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 9, 1996, at I; MacDonald, supra note 211, at BI.
246. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(c) (Supp. 1 1995). The auditor may, however, be subject to civil
penalties or other disciplinary actions. See id. § 78j-1(d).
247. Brodsky, supra note 7, at 4.
248. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(b)(2)(A).
249. Id. § 78j-l(b)(2)(B).
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that notification was in fact warranted, it might prove more fair for the
SEC and the courts not to hold the auditor liable if the decision not to
report the illegal act was based on the auditor's reasonable or good faith
judgment that the item was immaterial. If, however, the auditor's
judgment is afforded no deference, there will be little incentive for the
auditor not to report such items in order to protect himself against future
liability.
Congress's clear indication that the auditor's primary duty is to the
public and not to the client casts the auditor in the role of a detective.
While it is designed to afford investors with a greater level of protection,
it does so at the expense of the auditor-client relationship. Under section IOA, it will be more difficult for the auditor to readily obtain the
confidence of the client's management or play a significant role in
assisting management in resolving issues and problems that may arise.
Given the complexity and collusive nature of many illegal acts,
section 10A may offer little, if any, additional assurance that such acts
will now be detected and reported in a timely fashion.
VII.

RECENT EFFORTS BY THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION TO

250
ENHANCE THE AUDITOR'S DETECTION OF FRAUD

A.

Statement on Auditing StandardNo. 82

The Auditing Standards Board of the AICPA recently issued a new
auditing standard ("Fraud Standard") to provide enhanced operational
guidance on the consideration of fraud in conducting a financial
statement audit."1 The Fraud Standard was drafted in response to the
expectation gap between the accounting profession and the public
regarding the auditor's responsibilities to detect and report fraud, 2

250. The term "fraud" refers to intentional acts that encompasses both (i) fraudulent financial
reporting and (ii) misappropriations of assets. See Statement on Auditing Standards, supra note 9,
No. 82, 3; see also id. 2-10.
251. Specifically, the Fraud Standard (i) "[d]escribes fraud and its characteristics";
(ii) "[r]equires the auditor to specifically assess the risk of material misstatement due to fraud and
provides categories of fraud risk factors to be considered in the auditor's assessment";
(iii) "[p]rovides guidance on how the auditor responds to the results of the assessment";
(iv) "[p]rovides guidance on the evaluation of audit test results as they relate to the risk of material
misstatement due to fraud"; (v) "[d]escribes related documentation requirements"; and
(vi) "[p]rovides guidance regarding the auditor's communication about fraud to management, the
audit committee, and others." Id. at 1.
252. See Proposed Statement on Auditing Standards, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial
Statement Audit 8 (May 1, 1996) [hereinafter Proposed Statement on Auditing Standards]. The
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rather than as a result of the audit requirements outlined in the Reform
Act. 3 In issuing a new auditing standard that specifically addresses
fraud (i.e., irregularities), the accounting profession obtained the "add[ed]
assurance that the responsibility of the auditor regarding detection of
material 4 misstatement due to fraud is appropriately addressed." 5
The Fraud Standard requires the auditor to separately assess the risk
of a material misstatement due to fraud in designing the audit procedures. 6 In making this assessment, the auditor should focus on "fraud
risk factors" that increase the likelihood that fraudulent activity may
exist."7 The risk factors are distinguished by whether they relate to
fraudulent financial reporting or misappropriation of assets9 The
Fraud Standard offers the auditor additional guidance by listing examples
of risk factors which the auditor might consider when assessing the risk
levels.2" In addition, the auditor should also consider any other risk
factors based on their knowledge and experience of the company's
26
operations and industry, management structure, and internal controls. '
Once the risk assessment is completed, the auditor must determine
whether the nature, timing, and extent of planned audit procedures needs
to be modified or supplemented with more extensive procedures.262 In
making this decision, the auditor should also consider the expertise of the

Auditing Standards Board was also influenced by the findings and recommendations made by the
POB and Treadway Commission regarding the expectation gap "relating to the detection of material
misstatement in financial statements resulting from fraud." Id. at 7; see also supra notes 117 and

180.
253. While the Fraud Standard applies to audit engagements of both privately and publicly held
entities, the Reform Act applies solely to companies that are registered with the SEC.
254. See supra note 43.

255. Proposed Statement on Auditing Standards, supra note 252, at 7.
256. See Statement on Auditing Standards, supra note 9, No. 82,

12.

257. See id.
258. These risk factors are grouped into three categories, namely, (a) management characteristics, e.g., "management's abilities, pressures, style, and attitude relating to internal control and the

financial reporting process"; (b) industry conditions, e.g., those risks relating to the "economic and
regulatory environment in which the entity operates"; and (c) operating characteristics and financial

stability, e.g., those risks relating to the "nature and complexity of the entity and its transactions, the
entity's financial condition, and its profitability." Id. 16.
259. These risk factors are grouped into two categories, namely, (a) susceptibility of assets to
misappropriation, e.g., those relating to the "nature of an entity's assets and the degree to which they

are subject to theft" and (b) controls, e.g., those risks that "involve the lack of controls designed to
prevent or detect misappropriations of assets." Id

260. See id.
261. See id.
262. See id.

18.

17, 19.
19-25.
26-32.
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engagement team, the availability of necessary information and documents, and the potential effect the assessed risk may have on the audit
report. In order to make a meaningful assessment of the perceived risk
attributable to fraud, the auditor must possess an understanding of the
company's operations and internal control structure.263
If, after the audit procedures are performed, a misstatement is
identified, the auditor must determine whether such misstatement "may
be indicative of fraud" and whether it may be material to the financial
statements."6 At this stage, it may be necessary for the auditor to
perform additional procedures in order to determine whether a material
fraud exists.265 The results of the auditor's investigation may reveal a
significant fraud that warrants a communication with the audit committee
and the possibility that the auditor resign from the engagement.' In
addition, it is critical that the audit working papers clearly reflect the
auditor's assessment of risk attributable to fraud, planned audit procedures, and any additional steps necessary, based on the auditor's
judgment, to detect or dispose of any material misstatements.267
The Fraud Standard provides that in cases where the auditor has
determined that a fraud may exist, the matter should be brought to the
attention of management "even ifthe matter might be considered
26 The proposed standard recognizes that while the
inconsequential.""
auditor does not generally have a duty to disclose fraud to parties other
than the client's audit committee or its functional equivalent, such a duty
may arise in cases where the auditor is complying with certain legal and
regulatory requirements, 9 including, but not limited to, the auditor's
responsibilities under section 10A of the Reform Act27 and in connec-

263. See supra note 19.
264. Statement on Auditing Standards, supra note 9, No. 82,
265. See id. 35.

34.

266. See id. 36.
267. See id. 37.
268. Id. 38 (emphasis added). Under the Reform Act, such inconsequential matters need not
be communicated to the audit committee. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(b)(1)(B) (Supp. 11995). By advocating a lower standard in determining whether an item should be communicated to management, the
auditor will protect himself ifthe matter is later judged to be significant or identified by management
independent of the audit process.

269. See Statement on Auditing Standards, supra note 9, No. 82, 40. In addition, the auditor
may disclose such matters in connection with a communication with a successor auditor, see id.
No. 7, § 315, in response to a subpoena, and in accordance with certain governmental regulations,
see id.
270. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(b)(3).
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tion with the SEC Form 8-K filing.27'
B. Statement of Position272 94-6

Statement of Position ("SOP") 94-6, "Disclosure of Certain
Significant Risks and Uncertainties," provides specified standards to be
applied against risks and uncertainties that regularly affect an entity in
273
order to limit disclosure to "matters significant to a particular entity.,
The risks and uncertainties addressed by SOP 94-6 require disclosure in

four areas: (i) the nature of the entity's operations, 274 (ii) estimates used
by management in preparing the financial statements,275 (iii) certain
significant estimates, 276 and (iv) a possible vulnerability due to certain

concentrations 277 in aspects of the entity's operations.2 78 The SOP also

271. See supra note 131.
272. SOPs are issued by the Accounting Standards Executive Committee, the senior technical
body of the Accounting Standards Division of the AICPA, and generally involve a reporting issue
in a given industry. See DONALD E. KIESO & JERRY J. WEYGANDT, INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTIG
17-18 (8th ed. 1995).
273. DISCLOSURE OF CERTAIN SIGNIFICANT RISKS AND UNCERTA TIE , Statement of Position
No. 94-6, § 10,640 (Accounting Standards Executive Comm. 1994) [hereinafter SOP 94-6].
274. The financial statements should disclose a description of the "major products or services
[of] the reporting entity ... and its principal markets." Id. § 10,640.10. In addition, the entity should
disclose the "relative importance of its operations in each business and the basis for the
determination" in both qualitative and quantitative terms. Id.
275. The entity should disclose that "financial statements in conformity with GAAP" require
the use of estimates by management. Id. § 10,640.11.
276. SOP 94-6 provides that accounting pronouncements typically require disclosure about
uncertainties and estimates affecting amounts reported in the entity's financial statements. See id.
§ 10,640.12. Certain significant estimates are used by management when disclosing amounts related
to (a) inventory, (b) depreciation, (c) litigation reserves, (d) deferred tax receivables and payables,
(e) long-term construction contracts, (f) capitalized software costs, (g) the net realizable accounts
receivable, and (h) the carrying value of fixed assets. See id. § 10,640:18, app. A § 10,640.27.
Disclosure of significant estimates is required when known information is available with respect to
changes in the estimate, the effect of which would be material to the financial statements. See id.
§ 10,640.13.
277. "Vulnerability from concentrations arises because an entity is exposed to risk of loss
greater than it would haVe had it mitigated its risk through diversification." Id. § 10,640.20. This

includes concentrations in the following areas: (a) "the volume of business transacted with a
particular customer, supplier, lender, grantor, or contributor"; (b)"revenue [derived] from particular
products, services, or fund-raising events"; (c) "available sources of supply of materials, labor, or
services, or of licenses or other rights used in the entity's operations"; and (d) "the market or
geographic area in which an entity conducts its operations." Id. § 10,640.22 (footnote omitted).
SOP 94-6 specifically excludes disclosures relating to concentrations of financial instruments. See
id § 10,640.23. In such cases, disclosure is required if the entity is vulnerable to a severe impact,
i.e., a "significant financially disruptive effect on the normal functioning of the entity" in the nearterm, i.e., a "period of time not to exceed one year from the date of the financial statements." Id.
§§ 10,640.07, .21.
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provides illustrative language to be used by the auditor in assisting
management in drafting the appropriate disclosures,279 as well as background information and sources of information to assist the auditor in
forming the basis of his conclusions.2 8 Similar to the proposed audit
standard, the SOP will enable the auditor to detect and report significant
risks affecting the client's business to the investing public.28 '
The immediate impact on the auditor will be a determination that
the required disclosures are properly made. This may be accomplished
through the use of disclosure checklists which enable the auditor to
evaluate the issuer's compliance with SOP 94-6.282 In addition, the
auditor will likely need to revise existing audit programs and possibly
design new audit procedures in light of the required disclosures under
SOP 94-6.2s3
VIII.

CONCLUSION

By enacting section 10A, Congress codified audit requirements
already existing under GAAS and extended the auditor's reporting
requirement to include a direct communication with the board of
directors and possible notification filed with the SEC. In doing so,
Congress vested the auditor with the "broader duty to search and
sing,'2 4 thereby making the auditor the public's fraud detective. More
importantly, by including this duty as an anti-fraud provision, rather than
a periodic reporting requirement provision, the auditor will be subject to
both greater scrutiny and penalty for noncompliance.
The increased investor protections expected through earlier reporting

278. See id. § 10,640.02. SOP 94-6 does not, however, encompass risks and uncertainties
associated with "management or key personnel, proposed changes in government regulations,
proposed changes in accounting principles, or deficiencies in the internal control structure." Id.

§ 10,640.04 (footnote omitted).
While issuers have been able to implement disclosures in their financial statements with
respect to the nature of the company's operations and the use of estimates, definitional problems
with the meaning of such phrases as "reasonably possible" and "severe impact" have resulted in
implementation problems with respect to the disclosure of significant estimates and the issuer's
vulnerability due to certain concentrations. See C. Richard Baker, Implementing the SOP on Risks
and Uncertainties,CPA J.,
Feb. 1997, at 36, 37.
279. See SOP 94-6, supra note 273, app. A § 10,640.27.
280. See id. app. B § 10,640.28.
281. For examples of SOP 94-6 disclosures in recently issued financial statements, see Baker,
supra note 278, at 39-41.
282. See id. at 52.
283. See id.
284. DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 1990).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1997

51

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 4 [1997], Art. 5
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:1261

to the SEC will be offset by an equal decrease in the level of trust that
exists between the client and auditor. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit noted
that "[s]uch a duty would prevent the client from reposing in the
' This will
accountant the trust that is essential to an accurate audit."285
place a limitation on the auditor's access to information essential in
detecting instances of management fraud and run directly counter to
Congress's express intention that such acts be subject to an enhanced
reporting requirement.
As previously indicated, accounting firms are likely to increase their
audit fees to reflect both the additional procedures and greater liability
assumed in cases where the auditor is judged to have failed to comply
with the fraud detection and reporting provisions of section 10A. The
DiLeo court noted that this will result in companies refusing to pay the
additional fees or reducing those accounting services purchased in
addition to the audit. 6 This will ultimately hurt the investor as the
company will be spending more of the company's earnings on the audit,
while receiving a reduced level of auditor oversight of the company's
activities.s 7
Like all new legislation, many of the real effects of section 10A will
be determined by future action taken by the courts and the SEC. As
ambiguities in the statute are resolved and clearer standards are
established, Congress will need to do a postmortem and determine
whether it has achieved its objective of greater investor protection and a
more credible financial reporting process.
For the accountant, however, the political compromise is clear.
Congress traded the accounting profession proportionate liability in
exchange for the auditor becoming the public's primary tool for policing

285. Id. ("Firms would withhold documents, allow auditors to see but not copy ... if they
[for] fear that one of its ... auditors
would misunderstand the'situation and ring the tocsin needlessly, with great loss to the fim.').
286. See id.
287. See id; see also Goldwasser, supra note 232, at 75 ("[Management] may become less
candid with their auditors in an effort to avoid unnecessary witch-hunts. In this respect, Section 1OA
may actually make financial statements less (and not more) effective.").
288. Senator Wyden, the principal author of section 10A, stated that he was "pleased with the
recent work of the accounting profession and the [SEC] in clarifying the role of auditors in detecting
fraud." SenatorLauds Efforts to UncoverFraud,J. ACCT., May 1997, at 13, 13. Additionally, both
Senator Wyden and SEC Chairman Levitt noted that the new auditing standard, Statement on
Auditing Standard No. 82, will improve the detection of fraud and is consistent with the objectives
of section 10A. See id.
feared that access might lead to destructive disclosure ...
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and reporting corporate fraud. Time will only tell whether the public's
interests were best served by the accounting profession's and Congress's
strong support for this new legislation.
Andrew W Reiss*

* The Author wishes to thank his family and friends for their countless contributions and
continued encouragement and support throughout life and law school. This Note is dedicated to the
memory of the Author's grandmother, Rose Narzemsky, whose life and passing inspired him to
pursue a career in law.
The Author also wishes to express his gratitude to Professor Robert D. Ellis for his expertise,
time, and guidance; to Professor Ronald H. Silverman for his advice in the preliminary stages of this
Note and generous encouragement throughout law school; and to his former colleagues at Coopers
& Lybrand for the invaluable training and experiences which were utilized in the preparation of this
Note.
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